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1- Introduction
In 2011, with the spread of mass protests all over the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) against the long-standing dictatorial regimes, observers had high hopes that the region
would finally see a move towards democratization. Three years have elapsed and across the
majority of these countries, no positive changes have been made, with the states of Syria and
Libya deteriorating. Nonetheless, one country has remained an outlier within the Arab Spring,
appearing to have survived a successful transition process. Many political scientists and those
who have vigilantly observed the political climate of the region over the past few years,
including Secretary General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon, are in agreement that Tunisia’s
revolution has brought about a stronger political change to an organized form of democracy.1
Tunisia is the only country that has managed to substantially improve its political ratings
according to the annual Freedom House Freedom in the World index. Since rating Tunisian
political rights at a 7 in both 2010 and 2011, the country moved up to a 1. In the category of
civil liberties, the country progressed from a 5 to a 3 and they are now considered free.2 3 Egypt
on the other hand, which in 2010 began with a rating of superior political rights than Tunisia
with a 6, brought this down to a 5 in 2013 before receding once again to a 6 this past year. Its
civil liberty score has maintained a score of 5 throughout the period before the removal of Hosni
Mubarak until now. Similar to its political rights rank, Egypt was noted as being not free until
1

“Tunisia’s Successful Presidential Elections ‘Critical Step’ in Country’s Transition – Ban.” UN
News Centre, (2014).
2
Freedom House’s Freedom in the World index assesses each country on a scale of 1-7 for each
category. In this, 1 would be the best possible ranking, indicating a more free society and
country, while 7 is given to those countries who perform the worst in each category. Currently,
the only country in the region that is preforming slightly better than Tunisia is Israel, with a
rating of 2 in civil liberties.
3
“Freedom in the World: 2015.” Freedom House, (2015), 10.
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2013, at which point the election of Mohamed Morsi momentarily promoted Egypt towards a
status of partly free. After his removal, this classification once again reverted to not free.4 Since
Tunisia’s Jasmine Revolution instigated a boom of uprisings across the MENA Tunisia has
progressed to a much greater degree than any other nation. This is an intriguing case as many
factors were similar to those in other states within the MENA that attempted similar transitions.
For years, authoritarian leaders within the MENA region construed Islamist movements
as the greatest threat to their governance. In order to sustain a one party system, these leaders
manipulated Islamist antagonism to epitomize the inability of Islamists to partake in politics.
Both Tunisia and Egypt pursued political liberalization during the period Ben Ali and Mubarak
were in office. These periods terminated with a severe crackdown on Islamists. During this
crackdown phase, the leadership in these nations ruled with an iron fist, forcing Islamists to the
side through legislative means. Considerable and continuous efforts were made by Hosni
Mubarak and Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali to dismantle Islamist movements and
any considerable gains they achieved, creating an enduring rivalry between the state and
Islamists. Through the recent revolutions, this extreme polarization that began under generations
of former presidents has endured and created obstacles to the successful transition of both
nations.
The ousting of the incumbent authoritarian regimes forged the foundation of a new arena
in which Islamist movements could exploit their strong grassroots and social bases, despite their
position as opponents to the state. The tumultuous revolutions put a spotlight on the expansion
of Islam in the political evolution of these two countries. The revolutions in both Tunisia and
Egypt, which culminated in the removal of Ben Ali and Mubarak from their authoritarian roles,

4

“Country Status and Ratings by Region, 1973-2014.” Freedom House, (2014).
2

were a catalyst for the Islamist movements that were subject to extreme suppression for decades.
This Islamist revival resulted in a newly acquired position at the forefront of politics through
their engagement in political debate and dialogue. Within this new positioning, subsequent
events have sparked new controversies over the ability of Islamists to participate at the head of a
democratic state.
By 2011, Tunisia and Egypt both went through similar waves of turmoil, leading to the
removal of their despots and an Islamist momentum towards governance. Just over twenty years
ago, Algeria faced an incredibly similar scenario to that which we have been observing in Egypt
and Tunisia. The struggle to bring about regime change through mass uprisings in each of these
nations has resulted in a disconcerting transitional period. Now that Ben Ali and Mubarak have
been ousted, efforts to cope with Islamism persist.
Despite similar aspirations, the outcome of each revolution varied immensely for all
parties contributing in the process. While each of these nations has its own unique past, the
stimuli behind the upheaval in Egypt and Tunisia fall along similar lines. In both countries,
citizens were despondent with regards to their worsening living conditions and low human
development rates, all due to a weakening economy. This set the stage for the breakdown of the
authoritarian nature of these predominantly Muslim states and set them up for an unconventional
transition period with the Islamist parties taking a major position. As these states attempted to
distinguish their new political atmosphere as Islamic democracies, they have been confronted
with numerous complications.
Reactions towards the grasp at power of Islamist Ennahda party in Tunisia and the
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt have been immense. The ascendance of Egypt’s Muslim
Brotherhood in 2012 was ephemeral. As the first major Islamist movement established, its
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representative, Mohamed Morsi was installed in July 2012 after presidential elections, only to be
forcefully removed by the military just one year later. The military’s expunging of the Islamists
from power was exceedingly similar to that of Algeria in 1991, which lead to devastating
consequences across the country for a decade. While the removal of Islamists from power in
Algeria led to a civil war in Algeria, Egypt’s violent reactions were more fleeting. In conclusion
of the removal of Islamists from power, a new president was elected, one comparable to
Algeria’s with regard to their military background.
In spite of the apparent Islamist political failure, Tunisia’s Ennahda party survived the
interim government, taking a disparate approach than that of the Muslim Brotherhood. Harsh
reactions towards Islamists in Egypt and Tunisia transpired. Nonetheless, Tunisia, which
experienced minimal military intervention and whose governing jurisdiction lied in the hands of
Ennahda for almost three years before peacefully transferring power to a technocratic
government, has progressed further in its democratic aspirations. Although Ennahda took itself
out of power due to the demands of the people, this party once again managed to garner an
impressive standing with new elections in 2014. While Ennahda is known to be a moderate
political party, along the lines of Turkey’s AKP, their ability to confront the issues facing them
brought them to a vastly different outcome from that of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Even with Tunisia’s newly consolidated democracy, both it and Egypt have faced chaos
since their respective revolutions in 2011 due to the new administration’s spiraling
disagreements on Islam’s importance, along with unresolved grievances that instigated the initial
revolts.5 Both have experienced an exacerbation of the extreme polarization between Islamists
and secularists. Egyptians went to the polls twice, and initially seemed to have achieved a
5

Fareed Zakaria. “Fareed Zakaria: Why democracy took root in Tunisia and not Egypt.” The
Washington Post, (2014).
4

productive progression towards democracy. Yet, one year later, the military was back in power.
The Ennahda party relinquished control of their interim government in a more reasonable
manner in order to allow a technocratic governing body to take over. While there are still many
aspects of its political policy which need to be reestablished, Tunisia, by seeking the most
profitable outcome, seems to have reached democracy, following a more exemplary transition.
The interim governing figures engaged in Tunisia’s transition managed to contain the many
disparities whereas Egypt’s transitional bodies could not. Through this commitment to dialogue,
Tunisia has become an important example for other states in the region.
Research Question
Egypt is considered by many to be in a state of paralysis today due to the culmination of
events succeeding the 2011 revolution while Tunisia is perceived as significantly more
successful in its democratic achievements. Despite the fact that Tunisia sustained an interim
government for three years that was dispersed due to varying degrees of discontent within the
Tunisian population, its progression has been much greater than that of Egypt which had similar
internal issues. This thesis seeks to determine the reasons behind the consequences of Islamists
ascension to political power in both Egypt and Tunisia since the Arab Spring. Various factors in
the transitional period of both nations, including their historical backgrounds, the military
involvement, economies, civil society, and Islamist parties will be important in examining the
fates of both transition processes. The reactions towards various obstacles faced during the past
three years can all help to explain the paths taken by Tunisia and Egypt.
Based on these various factors, which may have possibly affected the transition of
Tunisia and Egypt, I will answer the following questions through in depth research on each
variable:

5

The military’s involvement may have played a pivotal role in hindering Egypt’s transition
to democracy according to many. The decades long competition between the military and
Islamists is extremely consequential in regards to Egypt’s democratic attempts. How
determinant was the military’s involvement in the transition process on Egypt’s failure?
Proponents of democracy and transition theory would suggest that perhaps Egypt was
bound to fail while Tunisia was set up for success. Was the transition in Egypt positioned to fail
substantiated by characteristics of its background and economy that transition theory often
alludes to in regards of the ability or inability of a state to become democratic?
What role did social movements and civil society play throughout the past years
concerning the transitions? Why is this more or less important than the other variables
examined?
Lastly and most importantly, through finding out the causes of the successes and failures
in each transition, I seek to answer the following;
How has Ennahda, despite many confrontations similar to those faced by the Muslim
Brotherhood over the past three years, maintained its position at the forefront of politics in
Tunisia? What is it about the specific circumstances in Tunisia that allowed Ennahda to
succeed? How much did each variable alter the state’s ability to come to democracy? Why did
we ultimately see compromise and moderation take place in Tunisia but not in Egypt?
As an exception within the states that went through the Arab Spring, Tunisia has
managed to achieve a more successful transition towards democracy, and Ennahda has preserved
itself in the process with high hopes for a future in Tunisian political governance. Through this
set of questions and comparisons regarding Egypt’s apparent failure, I attempt to discover which
variables have led Tunisia to a more successful transition with Ennahda still a key player. Each
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variable is fundamental towards analyzing the consequences. Ultimately, by asking these
questions I hope to examine how through the continuation of Tunisia’s transition, Ennahda has
retained its prominence and garnered respect both within Tunisia and on an international level.
Hypothesis
The more experienced and organized secular civil society of Tunisia contributed to the
emergence of compromise within the democratic transition by developing a coalition
government, therefore ensuring that Ennahda would take on a moderate stance while in power.
Within Egypt, an exceptionally deficient secular civil society was a major factor in the country’s
failure to achieve appropriate transitional measures.
Throughout the past three years, Ennahda was able to drastically alter their policies,
leading them to maintain the position they gained after the ousting of Ben Ali. This contrasts
with many of the inadequacies of other Islamist parties in the region, such as FIS, HAMAS, and
the Muslim Brotherhood, which all encountered defeat or longstanding struggles despite an
initial openness towards these Islamists. Ennahda, instead, has been hugely successful. Ennahda
was better positioned to deliberate and make settlements with other parties in the Tunisian
political sphere. Ennahda’s willingness to concede in issues that involve the state have greatly
influenced its maintained prominence. By instating a coalition government in Tunisia, Ennahda
was unable to appropriate complete control of the government like the Muslim Brotherhood did
in Egypt.
Many place the utmost importance on the military’s status within transition in order to
explain Egypt’s failure and Tunisia’s success. There are many apparent situational factors that
differentiate the revolutions, including this extensive military involvement in Egypt. In Egypt,
the army clearly played a pivotal role in the formulation of a new government, attempting to lead
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the country towards democracy. This was seen after January 25th, 2011 with the army’s
positioning during the revolution and after Mubarak was ousted on February 11th. Through this
entire period, the Egyptian military wanted to display that they were on the people’s side by
ignoring Mubarak’s demands. The military’s placement in the midst of the transition, leading
Egypt and instating new laws, has been considered detrimental to the promotion of democracy.
Again on July 3rd, 2013, the army took a place at the heart of the conflict, removing President
Morsi and introducing a new roadmap for the country. On the other hand, the Tunisian army
was not a main presence in the transition period. Rather than meddling in the state’s internal
political affairs, they kept to their foremost responsibility as the protection of the nation and its
people. Although military involvement in the Egyptian revolution hindered the process of
democratization, without their presence throughout the transition, no complementary
organization exists within Egypt’s civil society that could have successfully managed the
transition in a similar fashion to the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT) in Tunisia.
Despite the varying methods of bringing Tunisia and Egypt to newly founded elections,
one through civil society and one through the military, both nations initially had similar
outcomes. Through the first purportedly legitimate election process in either history, the citizens
of both nations brought Islamists to the forefront of politics. Regardless of the comparable
results of these first elections, the presence of civil society in Tunisia’s transition undoubtedly
aided in a smoother transition. Tunisia may have been better positioned for a transition towards
democracy due to various factors including a higher per capita wealth, a stronger education
system, and a larger industrial and manufacturing base, all of which contributed to a more
pronounced civil society. Therefore, as a better-suited electorate, the involvement of Tunisia’s
civil society within the development of transitional procedures helped to quell further problems
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that were encountered during this uneasy time. While Tunisia planned fresh elections at the end
of 2014 due to growing despair over Ennahda’s governance, the country’s inclusiveness brought
about a more well rounded effort. Even after this new election process, Ennahda acquired the
second largest standing within the new parliamentary structure.
While the military did take charge of the Egyptian revolution and the subsequent
transition after the ouster of Mubarak and Morsi, this is largely due to a civil society vacuum in
Egypt. With minimized military interference, a stronger institutional structure, and civil society
would have provided a greater chance for compromise, and it is possible that Egypt could have
managed a more successful transition to a democracy functioning in conjunction with Islamists
like we are now seeing in Tunisia. Because this major factor was omitted from the Egyptian
transition, its democratic process faltered once again leaving the military in command and the
Muslim Brotherhood banned, while Tunisia’s Islamists continue to thrive.
Method
This research will be primarily conducted through qualitative analysis. Gathering data
for this will depend on secondary research to test my hypothesis through scholarly articles, books
and academic journals. I will also collect data through primary sources including news articles
and government published constitutions along with other relevant information. This thesis will
be written as a comparative paper, examining the correlation between various variables that will
ultimately help provide insight into various issues facing these regime changes. Through this, I
will examine variables that may be similar or varied in the case of Egypt and Tunisia. The
correlation between these variables can help provide insight into the issues facing the regime
changes. The variables I intend to examine in each case include: how the attempt at transition
occurred, and what were the motivating factors, who was involved in the transitional periods and
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what transpired, the government and its institutional framework, how the election process was
devised, who developed the context within which elections would take place and reactions to the
context, and the role of the military, civil society, and Islamists. In examining the similarities
and differences within these variables, I will be able to demonstrate what factor was most
important in the failure of the Muslim Brotherhood, yet assisted Ennahda in maintaining their
legality and prominent position throughout political transition. I plan to use moderation theory
to look at how the Islamists managed their power after elections. Through the use of this theory
as an explanatory indicator for what transpired in each scenario leading to such diverse results,
my hypothesis will be supported further. Civil society played a major role in the process of the
inclusion of Islamists within Tunisia, and therefore is the most important variable in the
moderation that moderation theory suggests should develop within political openings.

10

2- Literature Review and Theory
Many factors influence a nation’s ability to successfully transition to democracy, with no
two transitions identical. In order to examine the interim period in the cases of Tunisia and
Egypt, each variable that may have been an element triggering the failed or successful transition
attempt must then be closely examined. Both states exemplify significant cases of transition
after a revolution in which one saw Islamists successfully manage its transition period, and the
other saw Islamists reverting to their pre Arab Spring status.
There have been frequent attempts by political scientists to examine the maintenance of
authoritarian regimes in the Middle East for half a century. While the rest of the world seemed
to be moving through what Samuel Huntington designated the “third wave” of democratization,
the Middle East stood firm within its authoritarian roots.6 It is essential to look at the rationale
behind this “robustness of authoritarianism” within the region and discern how the leadership of
the past has molded each nation and the ability of its civil society to combat the single-party
regimes in order to construct an effective progression towards democracy.7 Within this domain,
there are two important variables to observe; the role of the government in each nation and their
means of retaining dominance while suppressing civil society.
Before Ben Ali overthrew him, Habib Bourguiba ruled Tunisia since their independence
in 1957. Bourguiba ruled as a secular leader, creating a state with minimal tolerance for Islamists
to rise. At the same time, he was fearful of a military coup, as had occurred in many other Arab
states. This fear led to his decision of keep the army out of politics. Squashing the Islamists and

6

Samuel Huntington. “The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century.”
(Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993).
7
Eva Bellin. “Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East,”
Comparative Politics, (2012), 144-145.
11

the military undermined the two biggest threats to his regime. By forbidding many Islamic
practices and closing the Islamic university Zeytuna, Bourguiba maintained an unrelenting push
against a prevalent Islamic society in Tunisia and created a state at odds with Islamists.8
However, in 1981, there was a period of political liberalization. Through this time, the Islamist
Ennahda Party in Tunisia attempted to garner a position in the parliamentary elections by
establishing the group as a political party. Yet Bourguiba was not prepared to allow Islamists
into power. He imposed harsher laws on Islamist groups and imprisoned many of their leaders.
In reaction, Islamist responses became more severe. In the following years, “the growing unrest,
coming on the heels of mass protests and strikes by trade unions, undermined support for
Bourguiba and laid the groundwork for Ben Ali’s rise in 1987.”9
Ben Ali indicated that arrangements would be made to allow for a larger multiparty
system in Tunisia, and claimed that there would be elections, along with the elimination of the
authoritarian regime. He initially made plans to legalize the Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI)
and allow for its participation in elections.10 However, throughout his first years, people
recognized that these promises were not genuine. Despite this, there were few who protested
against the regime. The response of civil institutions within Tunisia against Ben Ali’s efforts to
maintain a closed off society, after promising a multiparty and more openly democratic system,
were not substantial. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan claim that a strong bourgeoisie is a major
component for democratization and that their hesitation to partake in major disagreements left
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John L. Esposito and John O. Voll. “Rachid Ghannoushi: Activist in Exile.” Makers of
Contemporary Islam, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).
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This led to the change of the name of MTI to Ennahda and the creation of the first legalized
Islamist party in Tunisia. They were soon after illegalized once again.
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Ben Ali in control.11 Throughout Bourguiba’s years in office, capitalism and labor industries
gained momentum and strength; however this was depreciated at the time of Ben Ali. Despite
restrictive laws shaping civil society, the UGTT was extremely developed, with firm objectives
and organizational expertise that allowed the UGTT to take on a major role in political conflicts
that faced the regime. With members who maintained a relatively close alliance to the Ben Ali
regime owing to bribes and extra privileges they received, the UGTT saw a slight confrontation
over ideologies at the onset of the revolution. Yet, the organization ultimately became the most
important actor in the post-breakdown government restructuring. During the revolution, the
UGTT was able to take a major role in promoting democratic transition, expanding upon the
influence it established previously.
Within both Egypt and Tunisia, when Islamist movements were banned in the 1990s,
these movements took the opportunity to produce a greater presence within associations and
other portions of civil society. As a banned organization, many members of Ennahda fled
Tunisia in order to avoid government action. In consideration of this, the overall scope of
Ennahda’s activism in Tunisia was minimal in comparison to that of the Muslim Brotherhood in
Egypt. Candidates from the Muslim Brotherhood even contested in various elections, and
garnered an impressive number of seats in Egypt’s parliament. Despite their ability to run as
independents on election ballots, their high numbers provoked a strong reaction by the state. In
2005, after an unforeseen gain in parliamentary seats by the Muslim Brotherhood, Mubarak
began once again with the execution and imprisonment of members across Egypt. In addition in
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the following elections in 2010, it was ensured that the parliament would not be shared, and
Mubarak’s NDP won the majority of seats, with a larger proportion than it had seen since 1995.12
During the most recent discord with the army in Egypt, the military has taken the
opportunity to demonize the Islamists once again. Exploring the importance of the military in
the states before, during, and after the transition attempts is important to discovering the
framework of each country. In most authoritarian regimes, the security apparatus will maintain a
robust position in politics in order to provide a secure environment for the leader. Yet for
democratization to succeed, “a withdrawal of the state to allow free spheres of social autonomies
and initiative, whether economic or associational,” must take place.13 As mentioned previously,
political scientists such as Eva Bellin made many attempts to examine the reasons behind the
strength of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. Bellin and others attribute part of this
strength to the regimes’ ability to pressure citizens into obedience, due, in large part, to their
maintenance of strict security apparatus. Following the revolution in 2011, the military was not
severed from the state. While Egypt has continuously ruled with a sturdy military regime,
Tunisia was regarded as a police state and this is a major facet of the different consequences.
Prior to the Arab Spring in 2011, Steven A Cook examined the role of the military in both
Egypt and Algeria. While not characterized specifically as military dictatorships, the two states’
militaries both play a strong role through governing indirectly, with great influence.14 The close
internal elite military relations with the head of state in Egypt was motivated by the desire to
“ensure the continuity of the political system” and, in Algeria, to “purchase political docility in
12

Kristen Chick. “Egypt Election Routs Popular Muslim Brotherhood from Parliament.” The
Christian Science Monitor, (2010).
13
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14
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Algeria and Turkey.” (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), 15.
14

the one-party state.”15 The use of the military apparatus played a huge role in the Arab Spring
due to their positions within the political structure and as a legitimizing force for one-party
politics. While the function of the military was meant to preserve the presidency, the role
seemed to change during the period of uprising, as the military did not continue their support of
the government, and instead the military in both states took on a role of their own as a main
actor. Cook forecasted that “without an external catalyst for change… patterns of authoritarian
politics will endure in military-dominated states like Egypt,” and since the Arab Spring, we have
seen that this appears to have materialized through the current situation.16 Egypt’s army may
have too closely followed the steps taken by the Algerian army during Algeria’s black decade,
leading to similar fallout. Tunisia’s proximity to Algeria may have made them more
conscientious of the potential failings had they taken a similar approach. This was evident in Ben
Ali’s decision not to conduct elections and revile Islamists after Algeria made the first attempt.
Many political scientists did not foresee the contribution that the military would play in
the overthrow of the authoritarian regimes during the Arab Spring, and since have scrutinized the
role taken by the armies. Previously, the military was largely undermined as solely a player for
the authoritarian government. Gregory Gause considers two reasons that affected the military in
their response to unrest during this period; “the social composition of both the regime and its
military and the level of institutionalization and professionalism in the army itself.”17 Tunisia’s
military institution remained relatively neutral throughout the revolts, maintaining their place
outside of politics. On the other hand, in Egypt, while the military did not support the
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government in its attempt to remain in power, associating with the peoples’ aspirations instead,
they immediately positioned themselves at the head of state in a move of self-interest.
Eva Bellin readdresses this issue, pointing out that the will of the armies was an
important element more so than the capabilities. By reexamining her previous work on the
“robustness of authoritarianism,” she points to two factors to determine the military’s purpose
during these revolutions: “the institutional character of the military and the level of social
mobilization.”18 The core interests of the military are “cohesion, discipline, prestige, and
legitimacy,” and these provide a role in the military’s determination to act on certain uprisings or
problems that occur within a nation, yet the military opening fire on civilians shows to be
opposite of the military’s goal of protecting the state.19 Bellin analyzes the unexpected numbers
which joined in protest against the regime, and the cohesion shown across multiple class levels.
She determined that these factors vastly differed from previous ideologies on social mobilization
in the Middle East. Attributing to this, were “long-standing grievances, an emotional trigger, a
sense of impunity, and access to new social media.”20 The grievances of the people provided the
emotional trigger needed to cause protest, and the access to the media provided an outlet for the
coming forth of hundreds of thousands of people to join together to express their outlook and
disdain for the regimes.
At this moment in time, civil society in both nations came out as a strong force to remove
the president. It was the period after the president left when civil society reactions became
immensely important. Tunisia’s civil groups did not leave the streets after Ben Ali fled. They
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made sure that the newly formed government was void of Ben Ali era leaders. They maintained
their presence until they were able to make their own completely new interim government. The
passive forcefulness of Tunisia’s sturdier civil society brought them on the path of
democratization. While movements within Egypt continued protesting the new incumbent
regime of Shafiq and SCAF over the following months, efforts were not as effective. As
Tunisia’s transition was inclusive of various branches of civil society, the management of
elections and new referendums was much more successful. Within Egypt, SCAF monopolized
the transition period after Shafiq’s removal and thus made very biased decisions that served the
military.
Within Egypt, one of the biggest questions is if Egypt will really transition from
authoritarian governance towards democracy. Will Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, a man of the military,
give up the power or will Egypt become the new Algeria? Tarek Masoud poses three reasons for
which he bases the idea that the military may be unlikely to surrender the power gained through
the revolts. Politically, economically and geopolitically, the Egyptian military has strong,
grounded power. The military in Egypt removed the transition from the citizens and have
decided the fate on their own. The actions taken by the SCAF after they took power, such as
abolishing the constitution in order to create a new one, show that their power is still enduring.
A “durable” democracy in the country is necessary, and great economic development is
absolutely crucial in the means to achieve this.21 These intertwined variables regarding the
previous regimes, the security apparatus, and civil society must all therefore be examined to
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determine how they have affected the transition and Ennahda’s continued presence in Tunisian
politics.
Democratization
This thesis will investigate the details of the Egyptian and Tunisian transition process
through the framework of democracy and transition theory. In this, the theories will aid in
examining which aspects of each case influenced the implementation of regime change and its
success. Transition theories have illuminated many of the variables that exist within nations that
have either successfully or inadequately transitioned towards democracy. By relating these cases
of attempted democratic transition in the Middle East through the theoretical frameworks of
democratization, we can see the distinctions that have made Tunisia a more likely candidate for a
prosperous transition. The behavior displayed by each state within its period of regime change
was molded from conditions of the pre-colonial state, and the one-party systems established postindependence.
Since the ousting of Ben Ali in Tunisia, Tunisians have taken a more methodical
approach within their transition. This provisional process was left to the Tunisian civilians.
Instead of rushing to complete the transition towards democracy, Tunisia’s interim government
has organized itself to follow a more outlined path to achieve a democratic process. In Egypt,
the military assumed a role as the provisional leader until an election was set to take place.
Tunisia’s civil society was the body that created electoral law creating a completely new facet of
government, as opposed to the military of Egypt which had always been an integral part of the
authoritarian regime.
In his article Why are there no Arab Democracies, Larry Diamond describes features that
he has found to prevent democracy. These factors include a poor economy. Despite some
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countries in the Middle East having a high GDP, low human development is a main challenge.
Other factors are problems with corruption, absence of formal taxation, and lack of motivation
for industry or institutionalization, therefore causing a weak civil society.22 Economic factors
were a major element contributing to the revolts and responses following the removal of each
leader. Despite a growing GDP growth rate in both Egypt and Tunisia, citizens became more
wary of the gap between classes and were unhappy with their lifestyle. Despite this, under Ben
Ali, Tunisian society was more economically liberalized in comparison with Egypt. Tunisia is
comprised of a more diverse industrial sector, higher levels of education, and stronger labor
movements.
In the instance that elections take place, the competition and pluralism will be constrained
to specific parameters; external support and reinforcement of “internal hegemony” promote the
preservation of Arab autocracies.23 These factors allow us to examine the event of the Arab
Spring. Both Egypt and Tunisia have a resilient civil society. Because of their culturally rich
past, social movements and civil society, especially religious, have been significant in the Arab
Spring. This can allow us to visit some reasons that Tunisia has had a more successful
progression towards transition. The UGTT has played a major role throughout the transition
process. Although the UGTT’s elite members serving as agents for the regime initially sided
with Ben Ali, upon realizing that the revolts were supported countrywide, the group made a
strategic move to support the Tunisian citizens. Thereafter the UGTT served as a prominent
figure in ensuring a smooth transition process. In addition, Tunisia’s economy is much more
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developed and diverse than that of Egypt, providing Tunisian citizens a larger presence within
the transition dialogue.
Seymour Lipset’s The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited focuses particularly on
essential levels of legitimacy a new democracy requires in order to be protected. He reaches the
conclusion that “because new democracies have low levels of legitimacy, there is a need for
considerable caution about the long term prospects for their stability.”24 A new democracy is
feebler, and will inherently have lower levels of legitimacy than a country whose democratic
system has been in place for years. Lipset ascertains that there are three measures a new
democracy must achieve: institutionalization, consolidation and legitimacy.25 Institutionalization
will come from developing legitimacy, an executive and electoral system, civil society, political
parties, rule of law and economic order. Throughout the process of regime change, Ennahda has
taken this important step in ensuring that Tunisian citizens are accepting of the new government,
and following more by-the-book policies to ensure legitimacy. This “supportive culture”
described by Lipset during the implementation of democracy was not found in Egypt.26 Through
this, democratization theory can provide insight into Tunisia’s more lucrative democratic
leadership.
“Democracy crafters in charge of the state apparatus must take into careful consideration
the particular mix of nations, cultures, and awakened political identities present in the
territory.”27 It is clear that Rachid Ghannoushi in Tunisia has seen this as an important issue in
the ability of democracy to survive. He was cited as stating that “in diverse societies the victors
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had to learn to share power ‘or else face falling into conflict and chaos,’” and Ennahda has taken
this to heart.28 This is entirely opposite to the Muslim Brotherhood’s stance, in which they
attempted to exploit their power like the previous authoritarian regime. The support garnered by
the Brotherhood over more than half a century gave them the reassurance of trusting that they
would not be resisted.
Because of the Muslim Brotherhood’s actions while in power, Egypt seems to be stuck in
a “political grey zone,” which Thomas Carothers described in the article The End of the
Transition Paradigm as countries stuck in the middle, between a democracy and a dictatorial
regime, without strongly displaying the traits of either. Carothers describes two types of
“political syndromes” which he sees to be included in this grey zone. The first he designates as
“feckless pluralism,” in which there are “significant amounts of political freedom, regular
elections, and alternation of power between genuinely different political groupings.”29 However,
despite this seemingly democratic process, the democracy is not really completely consolidated
and found in all aspects of governance. This “feckless pluralism” described by Carothers could
be where Tunisia has fit within their transition, as Tunisia took more democratic steps in order to
achieve a “consolidated democracy.”30 31 The second fallout he describes is “dominant power
politics,” in which “one political grouping (movement, party, extended family or single leader)
dominates the system,” which largely seems to be the case of Egypt and the grasps at power
amongst the Muslim Brotherhood and the military.32
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Nonetheless, it can also be argued that it is not possible to use prerequisites to determine
the likelihood of a democratic transition to take place. Because human nature is not always
predictable, a theory looking at transition can also be considered a “theory of ‘abnormality,’ in
which the unexpected and the possible are as important as the usual and the probable,” according
to Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter.33 However, even with this consideration,
they do seem to agree on some ideas of what generally is needed before a democracy, one of
those factors being political liberalization. This follows the lines of Lipset’s notion of
institutionalization being necessary for democratic transition. Another factor discussed by
O’Donnell and Schmitter that is more likely to prevent a prospective transition towards
democracy is violence. Throughout the past few years, Egypt has been hindered by various
skirmishes between groups with distinctive ideologies, which are stalling the process of
transition. In addition to these few aspects that are common in transitions towards democracy,
which is not to say that they are always present, human mentality plays a huge role. Through
this, it can be argued that the way in which certain nations see their situation greatly affects the
outcome. Actions can vary greatly depending on whether the nation is worried about a coup
taking place, the way in which they form pacts, or the perceived role of civil society or the
military. After a revolution, it can be difficult to get actors to play by the same set of rules, and
this can generate a great degree of insecurity throughout a transition. In Tunisia it has been seen
how different groups can communicate and come to a more rational settlement.
Moderation Theory
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Throughout the Middle East, various attempts at democratizing through Islamist parties
have failed. The Arab region has been home to a multitude of religious social movements, with
the most expansive being the Muslim Brotherhood. Branches of the Muslim Brotherhood range
throughout the Arab world and seek to gain political prominence. At various points in time we
have seen other countries implement Islamic parties within their governments. In the wake of
revolution in Iran, the country became the first in this experiment of political Islamization. In
subsequent years, we saw Algeria attempt to democratize through FIS, an elected Islamist party,
as well as the election of Hamas in Palestine. Additionally, Islamists have gained momentum
within several monarchies including Morocco and Jordon, yet these parliamentary elections, as
in Egypt and Tunisia do not provide real power. Nonetheless, their positions illustrate the
influence of Islamists across the region. Scholarly debate over Islam’s compatibility with a
liberal democratic system endured over decades due to the inherent contradictions that exist
between Islam, or any religion and liberal democracies. Secular governments have become
prominent within democratic systems throughout the rest of the world. The majority of Middle
Eastern states are endowed with rather homogeneous Muslim populations within which a rise of
Islamists to power always seemed to threaten democratic endeavors should authoritarianism
cease. In order to determine the role that Islamists take in a democratic system, moderation
theory has attempted to evaluate this process. Through moderation theory, scholars have
indicated how Islamists may internalize a democratic narrative in order to enter the political
field.
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Using moderation theory I will look into the notion that “political openings can
encourage Islamist opposition leaders to moderate their tactics.”34 In order for democracy and
Islamism to coexist, there must be a certain measure of “twin toleration.”35 This idea came along
with moderation in that “the first toleration is that of religious citizens toward the
state…democratically elected officials the freedom to legislate and govern without having to
confront denials of their authority based on religious claims… The second toleration is that of
the state toward religious citizens…requires that laws and officials must permit religious
citizens…to freely express their views and values within civil society, and to freely take part in
politics.”36 Both of these aspects of including Islamists within the political sphere imply the
need for a space in which members of religious groups and secular groups comply with one
another. They must formulate mutually beneficial discussions that can lead to the most
profitable outcome for all sides.
After the Arab Spring, this contentious issue was again brought to the forefront of
political apprehensions, as many feared the position Islamists would take in government. Would
the Islamists become an impediment to democratic transition in these countries? With such strict
guidelines based off of Sharia, the entrance of Islamists into the political realm was feared for
years. It was for this reason that Islamists were among the most repressed under the
dictatorships of Ben Ali and Mubarak. Decades of repression against Islamists in Tunisia and
Egypt due to a fear of their strength and political justifications did not hinder these movements.
Their presence after the removal of these governments was just as strong as the leaders had
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suspected, leading them to victory in both Tunisia and Egypt. However, the outcome of both
Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood differed drastically. It is assumed that once being able to
integrate into politics, radical “party leaders increasingly become concerned with state
repression. As a result, the greater a party’s electoral organizational capacity, the more timid its
policies are,” and within this, it is possible to note the difference between Ennahda’s political
presence and that of the Brotherhood.37 Ennahda seems to not only have succeeded in a more
democratic atmosphere over the past four years despite some bumps in the road, but also they
have continued their presence within a second round of parliamentary elections. The Tunisian
Islamist group founded by Rachid Ghannoushi won the largest number of seats in the first
parliamentary elections that took place in 2011 and subsequently had a considerable and
dominant position in politics. Although the two prime ministers in place from Ennahda were
transferred out of power with a technocratic government in 2014, its political stance has not
changed. In Egypt on the other hand, the Muslim Brotherhood, which had also gained a majority
of seats in parliament, reinforced even more so by the number of Salafists who were elected, lost
their chance at democratic representation. Because of the overall win of Islamists in Egypt, no
possible state repression could be taken out against them. The inconsistencies that lead both
prevailing Islamist parties on distinct paths must be examined.
In Tunisia and Egypt we have seen the effects of government repression on Islamists,
both hardline and reformist. Despite the pressure and atrocities of the previous leaders over
Islamists for the past few decades, Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood leadership have
maintained more open ideologies. However, there seems to be a fine line between exclusion,
causing radicalization of Islamists, and inclusion, causing their moderation. It is clear from the
37
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Algerian scenario, in which the Islamist party, the Islamic Salvation Front was given an opening
to political opportunity and participated in democratic elections in 1991, that the FIS was
initially open to pluralism and adopting policies necessary for its inclusion within the state. Yet
when the military announced that they would not abide by this electoral victory of Islamists and
essentially took power once again through a coup, this moderation of Islamists reversed.
Through the next decade, Islamists radicalized and terror existed throughout what is now known
as Algeria's black decade. This period demonstrated two opposing sides within one Islamist
movement. They formed a militant wing, the Army of Islamic Salvation (AIS). The AIS along
with the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) subsequently terrorized the country until elections in 1999,
when the new president, Bouteflika vowed to rid the country of terrorists.
Unlike the Muslim Brotherhood and Ennahda, FIS did not have a long-standing history
with the state. Its conception occurred only two years prior to the elections in which they won a
majority of seats. In 1989, it took only a period of seven months for FIS to be legalized by the
government and therefore take part in the election process.38 Perhaps due to their background of
being newly established, they did not have as strong of an ideology to fall back on as the Muslim
Brotherhood and Ennahda. It took Algeria ten years to quell the violence of the Islamists, who
were subsequently banned from forming political parties and taking a part in politics.
Within moderation theory, it is important to distinguish between two forms of
moderation, and how they were affected throughout the Egyptian and Tunisian transitions.
Through their incorporation into government, Islamist parties would be expected to exhibit both
political moderation as well as religious moderation. Under the authoritarian governments of
both states, political moderation did not exist, while religious moderation did. Both Ben Ali and
38
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Mubarak did not promote religion to a large degree, and were often at odds with those who did.
With the implementation of Islamists to the newly executed political sphere, many expected
political moderation to occur with an increase in the severity of religious ideals imposed on
society.
In discussing political moderation, I refer to adhering to democratic procedures and
standards. Güneş Murat Tezcür refers to this behavioral moderation. This facet of moderation
“concerns the adaptation of electoral, conciliatory, and nonconfrontational strategies that seek
compromise and peaceful settlement of disputes at the expense of nonelectoral, provocative, and
confrontational strategies that are not necessarily violent but may entail contentious action.”39
Throughout this thesis, it will be demonstrated how this feature of moderation took root in
Tunisia, yet was lacking within Egypt. Following the lines of moderation theory, Ennahda’s
inclusion into the transition is what gave them the ability to retain their political standing while
the Brotherhood’s complete conquest of the newly implemented political structure caused their
failure.
In the branch of moderation in which religion is discussed, which Tezcür refers to as
ideological moderation, there will be a focus on the restraint or lack thereof in enforcing
Sharia.40 This is an important factor to distinguish, because despite many of the political
ideologies of the Islamist movements, the fulfillment of Sharia is a common goal. While both
religious parties did not force religious ideals on Tunisian and Egyptian citizens, as had been a
common concern over Islamists in government, this does not indicate the elimination of this goal
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from their political stances. As seen in Egypt, all it took was the mismanagement of political
power for its citizens to plead SCAF to remove Morsi from office. It is therefore likely that had
the Brotherhood practiced a more moderate political stance yet attempted to enforce stricter
ideals based on Sharia, their removal would have still occurred. In the end, religious moderation
was not enough for the Brotherhood to succeed within their moment in politics. Moderation in
both political action and religious principles were necessary. Ennahda has practiced both
political and religious moderation during their tenure in politics. The environment of inclusion
within the Tunisian transition that was produced by politically neutral social movements made
moderation compulsory. There is no doubt that Ennahda has succeeded throughout the past four
years due to their ability to moderate politically and religiously. With the arrangement of
political order in Tunisia, moderation was not only an option for Ennahda, it was the only
approach feasible while ruling with two additional parties. According to Samuel Huntington, a
“participation-moderation tradeoff" would occur between reformers and moderates within
scenarios such as the transitions in Egypt and Tunisia.41 This is key in the electoral processes of
both nations as Tunisia witnessed the environment of both reformers and moderates taking part
in the democratic development. In Egypt, the group that would need to be reformed did not
merge with moderates, eventually eradicating the necessity for this “tradeoff” to occur within
their political development.
Political opportunities in Tunisia and Egypt provided a new space for new political
party’s inclusion into the political structure of a country. The inclusion into a newly developed
democratic makeup should provide that there exists a space for competing ideologies to
counteract one another and ultimately make more insightful decisions. Inclusion comes within
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the political realm by incorporating diverse political parties in a democratic state. It is civil
society that has the greatest impact on influencing the resulting environment. In the case of
Tunisia it was the strength of civil society in organizing the parameters around which political
contestation would take place, and forming the atmosphere in which political parties would
govern. Because of this push by civil society to arrange political parties in a power sharing
structure, Ennahda’s moderation took root. Ultimately, “moderation takes place not because
Islamists volunteer for it, but because strong checks and balances -- domestic and foreign -impose it.”42 Through the case of Egypt and Tunisia during transition, this notion continues to
expand and prove accurate.
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3- Military and the Regime:
Historical Links vs. Revolutionary Attitudes
Current rhetoric on the Arab Spring has studied in great depth the military involvement or
lack thereof as a major attributing factor to the success of the citizens who pleaded for the
removal of Ben Ali and Mubarak. There is a clear distinction between the countries and leaders
that had the backing of their military, including Syria, Libya and Bahrain with both Tunisia and
Egypt. The Tunisian army’s refusal to abide by Ben Ali’s demands ultimately supported the
people and gave the dictator no force to rely on. Egypt’s military similarly did not follow
Mubarak’s orders to attack the protesters and instead defended them against police brutality.
This is but one facet of the military and their support of the people and the revolutions. Their
proceeding actions also proved to be critical in the step towards democracy. It is first necessary
to examine the historical ties between the military and incumbent regimes to gain a better grasp
of their behavior both during the removal process and the subsequent positions taken. It was the
function of civil society in each state that greatly impacted the following years of transition in
both Egypt and Tunisia. Whereas in Tunisia, the strong UGTT was able to take charge in
developing a new political structure, “challenging the SCAF [in Egypt] require[d] sustained
unity of purpose and determination among civilian leaders and political parties and movements,
and a favorable external environment,” which did not exist.43
Military on the Backburner
As a relatively minor country, Tunisia’s military never played a strong political or
protective role. With minimal international threat towards the country, there was never a strong
need for its development into a greater force. Therefore, for the most part, the Tunisian military
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remained a separated constituent with insignificant government integration. Under Bourguiba’s
years in office, the military’s assignments only functioned to preserve internal stability and
intervene within national boundaries against Tunisians who protested the regime. As discussed
in the previous chapter, there was a common misconception among many political scientists over
the years that ascertained that the ability of Arab autocrats to maintain power and keep
authoritarianism alive after decades was due to the power of its military as a way for presidents
to keep the people at bay. Since the revolutions, we witnessed that the government did not have
as much support from their security apparatus’ as formerly suspected.
President Habib Bourguiba began the Tunisian policy of maintaining an undersized army.
He had a strong conviction against the military playing a role in politics, fearful of a coup,
similar to those occurring across the region. This encouraged Tunisia’s maintenance of a
relatively professional military, not sustaining the regime unlike many militaries of the region.
Although there was no need for the military to engage in international encounters, they did play a
role in mollifying internal conflicts. In both 1978 and 1984, Bourguiba utilized his armed forces
in order to suppress internal revolts caused by social issues, and in both instances, these reactions
did not turn out successfully, ultimately leading to many deaths.44 Thus, the use of the military
as an internal security apparatus was not advocated. Hence, “distrust began to grow between
certain members of the military and the leadership of the Interior Ministry, and military leaders
started to voice concerns… [of] poor decision-making on the part of the country’s political
leaders.”45 The poor results from involving the military in these internal conflicts only abated its
involvement in further clashes. The push of the government towards the army’s role in subduing
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these conflicts along with a cut in military expenditures resulted in a growing fracture between
the military and the government. The threat of Libya on its borders and Islamists externally and
internally left the military in a debilitated state, as they were not perceived to be suited towards
handling any conflict.46
Ben Ali’s Police State
As Ben Ali came to power, he continued to marginalize the military, instead placing even
greater focus on the function of police. Although Ben Ali did have a military and security
background, he was similarly fearful of its potential power. Before removing authority from
Bourguiba, Ben Ali was the head of the Interior Ministry, which provided him the advantage he
needed to support a police regime.47 He formed the National Security Council upon his
ascendance to power as a means to assess the army and its policies.48 He immediately made it
clear that any threat against his regime would result in a harsh penalty. Ben Ali constantly sent
the military on missions intended to distract them from his own endeavors. Additionally, he
continued to ignore the needs for military expenditure that began under Bourguiba, including
updating and maintaining equipment.49 This great distrust for the military in his attempt to
eliminate the potential threat of a coup eventually backfired when he needed their support in
2011.
Despite Ben Ali’s investment in the internal security apparatus of Tunisia over his years
in office, when the time finally came for his protection, the police were unable to provide enough
support for his presidency. The police strength was not as robust as it needed to be to keep the
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protestors off the streets, and when General Rachid Ammar, the head of the Tunisian army
publicly declared his support for the Tunisian citizens and their plight against the dictator, there
was nothing the police force could accomplish to benefit Ben Ali.50
With Ben Ali’s background in the military and as interior minister in Tunisia, he could
have gotten support from both for the start. Yet his decision to continue with Bourguiba’s small
military ultimately cost him in a way he did not expect. As interior minister of Tunisia during
Bourguiba’s time as president, he was strongly tied with the security and intelligence sectors in
Tunisia, and decided to continue promoting this division. The police ultimately bid his will
when they were needed and became the only force that would threaten Tunisian citizens. Brutal
attacks and torture were commonplace with Ben Ali’s police force, and Tunisia was thought of
as one of the worst police states in the world. Although the statistics regarding the number in the
police force was grossly exaggerated by almost 100,000 during this period, the police was still
feared.51 When the military refused to follow the orders of Ben Ali and instead protected the
Tunisian citizens from these brutal attacks during their peaceful protests, Ben Ali had no hope.
Unfortunately for Ben Ali, his years of support for the police force and diminishing of the
military had a different consequence than what he anticipated. Ultimately, his attempts to
prevent a coup against him by sidelining the military and providing them with menial
peacekeeping tasks and little fiscal support lead to his defeat. The military saw no reason to keep
Ben Ali in power, and saw that they would be more likely profit from a democratic system.
Throughout the progression of weeks following Ben Ali’s departure, the people
continued to protest to ensure that their goals be attained. While Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia,
his cronies “believed that the revolution was nothing more than a popular uprising that had
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ousted the president but had not displaced the political system.”52 After ignoring the hopes of
Tunisians, Mohamed Ghannoushi stepped in as Prime Minister in the coming days, following the
existing constitutional provision.53 The people, however, saw this as a continuation of the old
regime and therefore would not accept it. They continued to protest his removal in order to
achieve a completely new system free of Ben Ali’s associates and any members of the
Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD). Through this period, the police continued attacking the
protestors in an attempt to stop them and protect the incumbents of Ben Ali’s party, as this would
have been the most beneficial outcome for the corrupt police division.54 Since the removal of
Ben Ali and his cronies succeeded, there is a larger effort to diminish the role of the police,
purging them of their previously elevated status.55 In contrast with the police force, the support
from the army during the revolution and refusal to take part in actions against the protestors
along with their continued exclusion of any major role in the revolution helped Tunisia
successfully move towards democracy on the conditions of the people.
Taking The Army out of Politics
Within the past four years, there have been several interim governments and moments
allowing Tunisian citizens to take part in the voting process, providing them more rights and a
stronger awareness of the political process. Through taking charge of their own revolution, one
that they had launched, along with minimal intrusion from the army, the democratic process has
thus far been successful. By not immediately stepping in and insisting that they monitor the
transition process, the military created a vacuum in which it was necessary for the people to
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determine on their own fate. By becoming the decision makers for the proceeding elections and
organizing a change in the government structure, Tunisians had far more authority. From this
point, Tunisians came to the voting booths for the first time on October 23, 2011, in what was
considered a free election of the National Constituent Assembly (NCA).56 It was at this time that
Ennahda began to exercise their rights to participate in the political sphere along with all other
political parties. Through the elections, the strength of the Islamists was envisaged for the first
time by gaining a majority of the seats in the NCA. The task of creating the first constitution of
Tunisia was placed in the hands of the NCA, along with electing the first president, Moncef
Marzouki, for this interim period.
However, despite taking these steps towards consolidating democracy in Tunisia, various
acts of political violence occurred. The assassinations against political rivals including Chokri
Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi caused various rifts in the interim government, with transfers in
power supervening in order to calm growing reservations amongst the people.57 Although acts
of violence took place in the past few years, creating problems for the interim transitional
government, the military did not step in and attempt to solve the problem for the people as the
Egyptian military did, and instead civil society managed to incorporate suitable solutions for
concerns brought forth over the years. In doing so, the entire political process since Ben Ali’s
removal has been entrusted to the Tunisian population. When issues within the elected interim
government became so great that a new resolution was needed, its organized civil society did not
hand over power to the army and expect a solution from this institutional power. Instead, the
people decided to create a technocratic, politically neutral government in January 2014. This
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transfer in power was meant to quash the growing polarity that existed within the Islamist and
secular powers.
Rather than allow the political deadlock to continue, a roadmap was created for this
change in leadership that the military did not participate in. Concessions were made by each
party in order to come to a final decision, but ultimately the wishes of the Tunisians were
respected in order to resume a smooth democratic transition, with the military presence existing
only to maintain order and peace throughout areas in which violence was prevalent. In chapter 5,
this importance of civil society and its stance in the post-revolutionary period will be discussed
further.
Egyptian Regime Military History: Internal Attachments and International Conflict
The Egyptian military, in contrast with the Tunisian case, has had a long interspersed
history with the government. Since the Egyptian Coup in 1952 in which the Free Officers
Movement brought Nasser to power, its military has played a prominent part in all aspects of
Egyptian society. Unlike the Tunisian military, Egypt’s armed forces have been involved in
numerous external conflicts, most notably with Israel. Due to international rivalries experienced
over the past half century, there was a much greater need to bolster the military. Mandatory
conscription occurs in Egypt just as in Tunisia, but the quality of education for its members is
much more advanced.58 Overall there has been a clear, prominent disposition of the government
towards the military in Egypt. Along with its stronger role as a legitimate source of protection
for the state, the military had historically long ties with the government. Each Egyptian
president up until the revolution came through a military background.59 Lastly, the Egyptian
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military also constitutes a major economic force in Egypt, controlling companies in various
industries across the country. It is speculated that Egypt’s military controls up to 40% of the
GDP through these enterprises.60 Each of these three factors must be explored in greater depth in
order to gain an enhanced understanding of the armed forces commitment to the revolution and
their subsequent engagement.
The history of the military is tied into two main factors: their relationship with the
government on one hand, and as the state security apparatus on the other. In 1952, Naguib came
to power through a military coup, during which the king was overthrown and banished, leading
to the declaration of Egypt as a Republic and bringing an end to the monarchy. Due to his strong
military position and support from the people who desired a regime change after the loss of the
Arab-Israeli war in 1948 for which King Farouk was condemned and the weakness of the
Egyptian royal regime was exhibited, Naguib became the first president of Egypt.61 Naguib
promised he would restore political parties and hold elections. However, he also proposed an end
to the revolution and that the military council be disbanded, believing the military should not run
a country.62 Gamal Abdel Nasser, who also had a major role as a leader of the military
revolution, supported the voice of the people who cried, “long live the revolution,” and vowed to
make sure that their demands would be met.63 President Naguib recognized the need to change
his stance on various issues, which began to make him unpopular. So he conceded to the desires
of the people and continued the revolution, but he also decided to suspend elections due to his
unpopularity. Despite the fact that Naguib acquiesced to his citizens, he was not prepared to act
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as a puppet. He wanted more power, which eventually caused him to become ostracized.
Through a military coup, he ultimately was forced to resign in favor of Nasser ascending to the
presidency.64
Nasser’s stance largely differed from Naguib’s because he believed military power was
needed in Egypt in order to keep out British influence and suppress unwanted political resistance
groups from forming. His promotion of Arab nationalism was so strong, that the term
“Nasserism,” was created, referring to the considerable contribution he made to the identities of
Arabs in his foreign policies because of his strong nationalist ideals.65 He sought to augment the
military both in terms of fighting capacity and as part of his government. In 1955, Israel
attacked Egyptian posts in the Gaza strip. Egypt was denied arms by the West for this war and
was unprepared for this nature of Israel’s preemptive attack.66 This strike on Egypt
demonstrated the apparent fact that the Israeli army had a distinct military edge, with an army
that was superior in every way to any other in the Middle East. Since there was an apparent
advantage for Israel in being allied with the West, Egypt needed a military advantage as well.
Thus, they turned to the Soviets as their next apparent option. Nationalizing the Suez Canal in
1956 was seen as Nasser’s great military feat. However, ten years later the 1967 Six-Day War
became his greatest defeat and caused him to lose popularity.67
After Nasser’s death, his Vice President Anwar Sadat was appointed as the new president
in 1970. Initially, Sadat followed up with some of Nasser’s policies in order to maintain the
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popular public opinion of him. Though unlike Nasser’s regime, Sadat changed the bureaucratic
order of the government so that it would consist of a minimal amount of military and be more
inclusive of diverse civilian cabinet members from different social classes. His implementation
of a parliament diminished the spotlight of the military instead moving towards a more civilian
government. With a diverse cabinet more representative of the civilian population, Sadat was
more open to new policies than Nasser with his small, close group of legislative confidants.
Despite the fact that he opened his cabinet, Sadat still maintained the authoritarian nature of the
regime only containing members of the National Democratic Party.68 For Sadat, economic
improvement was also imperative. Under Sadat’s government, the policy of Infitah was engaged,
displaying his willingness to work with the Western world in return for support. Infitah
specifically refers to the opening up to the West and to private investment generally, announced
by Sadat in the wake of the October War.69 During the October or Yom Kippur War in 1973,
Egypt and Syria successfully attacked Israel with tough and devastating strikes that was
condemned by the West. Nonetheless, his focus towards economic development over the next
fifteen years exemplifies the slow move of the government away from the military that had been
so imperative to Nasser’s advance to power and his government. In 1978, in the Camp David
Accords, a peace treaty was signed with Israel, in return for Israel’s withdrawal from a
significant amount of Arab land.70 While the major threat to Egypt ceased, its military continued
to maintain itself as an important army against any international threat. It was necessary that it
retain its power in the event that peace be broken or other conflicts ensue.
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When Mubarak came to power in 1981, he continued on the path of improving the
Egyptian military and modernizing its systems, placing the greatest importance on their outward
ability to be strong in case of any international attacks. However, he kept the military
exclusively within this mode, not giving them much power in the government.71 A
disproportionate amount of aid given to Egypt went straight to its army, developing its strength,
and giving the military elite great benefits. The supplementation of the military aided in
maintaining a one-party state and sustained Islamists at a distance. However, the slow
disintegration of the historical involvement of the army both in international conflict and within
the government had lasting impacts on the revolution of 2011 and the subsequent three years of
transition.
The Egyptian Military Economy
Because of the large military expenditures, this institution became the most well
maintained, and therefore considerably more advanced than the remainder of the state. It was
under Mubarak, and through his efforts to liberalize the economy that the military began to
involve themselves in additional aspects of Egyptian society. In Egypt, the large amount of
effort and focus placed on the military has allowed it to create its own economy within the state,
constituting an estimated 10 to 40% of Egypt’s entire economy. The military has established
corporations in transport, energy, computer technology, and many other important sectors that
would be important to have developed by private companies.72 A massive amount of the foreign
aid that comes to Egypt is placed directly into military expenditures. By placing such a large
emphasis on the maintenance of authoritarianism through this security apparatus, certain classes
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continued to flourish while others remain in poverty. The military, which has been supplied with
huge amounts of support internally and internationally from aid, has only used this support to
spread across multiple sectors. The strong buildup of institutions such as the military in order to
deter opposition has impaired the economy.
Military Revolution
The 2011 popular revolution that took place in Egypt was an uprising of people across
the entire spectrum of Egyptian people, from the youth to the elderly, university students and
those with little education, Christians and Muslims. All classes were involved. Like Tunisia’s
Ben Ali, Mubarak asked the military to step in and support the regime but the military refused.
Despite the support that the armed forces received from the regime and the prominence they had
in Egypt, they were not as devoted to Mubarak, as he had consistently kept them out of the
government, unlike the years under Nasser and Sadat. The military forces therefore saw no
reason to bow to the demands of Mubarak. In fact, they had more to gain with Mubarak’s
removal. It was instead the police again who attacked the protestors while the military attempted
to block these attacks and protect the Egyptians and their revolution.73 On February 11, 2011, it
was announced that Mubarak had stepped down and that his power would be transferred to the
military. Field Marshall Tantawi, the head of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces
(SCAF), promised that elections would be held within the next six months and they would do
what they could to protect the revolution of the people.74 However, this was only the beginning
of the military involvement in the long transition process.
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On March 20, 2011, the SCAF instituted a newly approved constitution in which Article
56 gave them complete governing power over all aspects of Egyptian government and its
governing procedures.75 Over the next year until elections finally came about, there was a
constant fear that the military would not give up its power and bring the country to elections.
Despite the fact that the military showed reserved stance during the revolutionary process by
refusing to attack the Egyptian citizens who protested in the street, over the course of time they
became more involved. After the ousting of Mubarak, protests continued around the strong role
that the military took as the figurehead for transition. Movements against the SCAF included
efforts to stop military trials against civilians, and ending their control outright.76 Reactions
towards these protests were not as docile as those that had attempted to eject Mubarak only
months prior. The military finally fully controlled the government and did not want to let this
out of their hands with ease. On October 9, 2011, the military completely squashed protests by
Egyptians Christian Copts, against the destruction of a church in Upper Egypt.77 Despite finally
having access to the government, and protesting alongside the Muslims during Mubarak's ouster,
the Copts felt that they were becoming slowly pushed to the side once again. Following this, and
additional military actions towards women protestors, Egyptians became completely fed up. The
military went from attempting to side with Egyptians in order to remove Mubarak to completely
against them. The protesters slogan "Irhal" demanded the complete removal of the military.78
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Ultimately elections were announced for May and June 2012, and the end of military rule
in Egypt was in sight.79 However, in the first round of elections in May when the final
contenders included Ahmed Shafiq, a member of the old regime and a military man and
Mohammed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood, the people saw only one way out of the SCAF's
control.
Although Morsi was elected, after a year of failed policies and an outward appearance of
only promoting the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic ideals within its political process, Egypt
was again unhappy with the results. This led to a second large scale demonstration beginning on
June 30th, 2013, in which only three days later the military again took the control of the
government out of the incumbent’s hands, promoting a new road-map for the country. Despite
the installation of non-military into government positions during this second era of transition,
showing that the military did not wish to keep their grasp on complete government power, the
people still felt the control was ultimately in the hands of SCAF.80
On June 8, 2014, Sisi was inaugurated as the new president of Egypt, coming only a few
months after resigning as the chief of the armed forces, and almost one year after deposing the
previously elected leader of Egypt.81 While many people see hope through this new election and
find comfort in Sisi's leadership, Egypt has been left more polarized than ever and reverted back
to the military leadership that existed since the country’s independence. This scenario falls along
similar lines of what Algeria experienced twenty years prior. The Algerians who initially
supported Abdelaziz Bouteflika, an affiliate of the military, like Sisi, found comfort in his
vicious stance on Islamists and terrorists in Algeria after ten years of bloody civil war. Yet after
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fifteen years he is still in power and the people are unsure that he will relinquish control. Despite
attempts at democracy and opening up the system, Bouteflika claims the necessity to maintain
his leadership position in order to protect the country and Algerian citizens from further terrorist
activities.82 In the coming years, we will begin to see how Sisi's leadership role will affect
Egypt, and if it follows in the footsteps of Algeria as it seemingly has in the past few years.
Conclusions
Although the military stayed out of the initial revolutionary process in both Tunisia and
Egypt, protecting their fellow countrymen from the brutalities of the police forces that followed
the orders of the incumbent government, the resulting transitional approaches were quite varied.
In Tunisia the new government must find a way to remove the corruption of the police force and
make them a more professional association. The continuation of police attacks after Ben Ali was
removed from office showed their perseverance and commitment to the old regime, by
attempting to keep the RDC in power. Through the preservation of the RCD, the police force
would have secured their dominance, maintaining their methods of attacking and harassing
Tunisian citizens. Removing the strength of the police as an internal intelligence system for the
government is already a focal point for the interim government, in an effort to construct a more
democratic country with stronger freedoms for its people. In contrast to the police forces, the
military has remained a solely peacekeeping force for the revolutionary and transitional route
with no intent to change their position. Without this imposed military action, Tunisian citizens
have been able to focus on issues within the government that are of great concern to the security
of the state. The promotion of economic success and elimination of authoritarian measures that
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were in place is an integral matter in the development of Tunisia’s democracy. This has
ultimately become more possible because this transition was placed in the hands of civil society.
The drastically different procedures launched by the military in Egypt, initially displaying
itself as an entity that would side with the people during the transition, completely altered the
course of democracy. When they first took charge of the country and demanded to be in
complete control over every governing aspect, apprehensiveness amongst Egyptians began.
When elections finally did take place, Egyptian's believed they successfully achieved democracy.
Yet once again with the interference of the Egyptian military, this hope was brought to an end
and the military continued to play a major part in the governing policies of Egypt. With two
elections in one year’s time, this process has hardly been seen as democratic, and the future of
Egypt is uncertain. The question remains, with the military back at the helm of Egypt, will
democracy continue to be a goal or will the security apparatus once again sequester total
authority without any plans of abdication? The military's background of historically intrinsic
government relations in Egypt may suggest that power is their ultimate goal rather than solely
being the protectors of the revolution.
Ultimately, it was the failings of the Muslim Brotherhood that brought the military back
into power and prevented the country’s democratic process from thriving. It is clear that the
involvement of the military did hinder attempts at democracy in Egypt. On the other hand,
without the military’s intervention after Mubarak left his post, it is difficult to imagine another
scenario in which negotiations could occur that would have allowed another alliance to form and
take charge as in Tunisia. The fault does not necessarily fall on the military for seizing power,
but the intrinsic fact that Egypt's civil society lacks any other significant social group that has the
ability to take charge of this process. It was the Egyptians that asked for military intervention on
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more than one occasion within the transition, as there was no civil group with the strength to
force Morsi out of power and then monitor a new deal for elections. Additional detail on the
importance of civil society and the Islamist movements in these Egypt and Tunisia will be
examined in Chapters 5 and 6.
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4- Economic Dismay:
Revolutionary Motivation vs. Transitional Hindrance
Transition theory has often incorporated elements of development as a key-transitioning
factor. As stated in Chapter 2, much research has attempted to grasp how the economy of a
country affects its transition to democracy. Therefore it will be important to look into the
economies of both Tunisia and Egypt to examine how any differences could have established a
different sphere of change for each country. It is clear that from the outbreak of the revolutions
in Tunisia and Egypt, the protesters were discouraged by their dismal living conditions and
prospects for growth. Due to the lack of economic improvement brought about by their
presidents over the past decades, conditions in both countries were inadequate. The economic
demands of the revolution have clearly not been met, yet Tunisia still seems to be on the
appropriate path to democracy. Just as dictators in the Middle East used military power in order
to coerce their people from protests, they attempted to create an economy that would keep their
people bonded to the regime. Instead of creating an economic environment that would promote
and sustain its people, the goal was the sustenance of the autocrat who would make the people
reliant on his regime. There was a clear intention in both of these states to control and maintain
people's allegiance. Although because Tunisia and Egypt are not countries that rely heavily on
rents, a factor that has kept many other authoritarian leaders in the Middle East in power,
Tunisian and Egyptian governments could not easily appease the people’s demands as witnessed
in many of the oil rich Arab states. Despite these vain objectives, we can see in both cases how
their pursuits were crushed. This chapter will look at the pre and post-revolutionary economic
climate to examine any major discrepancies in Tunisia and Egypt that could account so greatly
for one country to become more democratic than the other. It also will study the variables which
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are attributable to the poor economic performance of Tunisia and Egypt that caused massive
uprisings and how any differences could explain the outcomes.
Liberalized Economic Reforms
Ben Ali and Mubarak did attempt economic reforms throughout their periods of
governance, with plans to liberalize their country’s economies in the past few decades. The
reforms were installed with backing from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World
Bank. Through agreements between both countries and these financial institutions, they were
put on the track of following the Washington Consensus. This set of policies set up by these
international institutions, including both the IMF and World Bank, the World Trade Organization
(WTO) and some first world countries, intended to bring about economic growth in these two
economically desolate countries. This set of ten important economic changes to be made
included: “fiscal discipline…public expenditure priorities - moving them away from subsidies
and administration towards previously neglected fields with high economic returns, tax reform…
financial liberalization… exchange rates… trade liberalization… increasing foreign direct
investment (FDI)… privatization…deregulation - abolition of regulations that impede the entry
of new firms or restrict competition …secure intellectual property rights (IPR)… [and a] reduced
role for the state.”83 Both leaders did follow many of these steps towards improving the
economic conditions of their states. In Ben Ali’s attempts at economic reform, he tried to
minimize the public sector, remove subsidies and trade barriers in order to pay off massive debts.
His initial promise to Tunisians was that he would democratize and liberalize Tunisia, leaving
many hopeful that there would be an extensive change in governance and economic outlooks.
Furthermore, the failings of Bourguiba’s economic policy before the political coup in which Ben
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Ali brought himself to power, gave Ben Ali support when he decided to adopt the new economic
principles set forth by these international organization that he had early refused to participate
with. Although Ben Ali’s Tunisia was hailed as becoming successful through these changes in
economic policy, the reality was inferior. While not as successful as the gross domestic product
(GDP) per capita growth rate of 3% per year had indicated outwardly, its economy was still
among the strongest in the region for a non-oil producing country.84 The perceived stability that
Ben Ali had brought to Tunisia was all brought to shreds, highlighted by the citizens’ demand for
change in the government and economic security.
The poor economic development through Ben Ali’s liberalization plans shaped different
regions in various ways. Within the coastal areas, industrialization became more developed,
causing great urban development. Within the interior region of the country, people did not
witness as much growth and development. The unbalanced investment into the country’s
economic expansion caused a major rift between Tunisians. This regional disparity was a cause
of major concern, and many riots against the government and its economic programs took place
within these underdeveloped cities. The imbalances present within the Tunisian workforce and
its great class divide was a bolstering factor for the discontent voiced against Ben Ali.85 In
addition to access to jobs, this disparity occurred in terms of educational opportunity and access
to a multitude of resources that improved the lives of middle class Tunisians living in urban
centers.86 Within Tunisia’s revolution, protests began within the rural sectors and later extended
into the more urban coastal cities. It was with the participation of the more urban elite that the
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revolution could ultimately become successful. This exhibit of support across all sectors became
extremely significant for Tunisia’s transition.
As discussed in Chapter 3, Sadat began Egypt’s economic liberalization reforms in the
1970s with his process of Infitah. This attempt at liberalization was unproductive. Although he
opened up Egypt to foreign investments, all the investments were geared towards specific sectors
and did not improve economic outlooks for Egypt. The debt increased as it had under Bourguiba
and rising prices hurt the middle class. Bouguiba and Sadat both reduced subsidies, limiting the
worth of their citizens and leading to similar riots in both countries that required military
intervention to control. Consequently, Mubarak, just as Ben Ali, came at a time of dire
economic troubles that they expected to fix. Both initially sought to liberalize the state
economically and politically. Under Sadat’s Infitah, “no growth of industrialization took place,
but consumerism and importation was encouraged,” ultimately a paradox that was not possible.87
After the failure of his subsidy cuts, Sadat put them back in place and Mubarak did not change
this, although it was a designated step within the Washington Consensus plan for economic
development. The public sector that Nasser had so boldly built up was still the principal segment
of Egypt’s economy and a minimal private sector existed. With an ever-expanding debt and the
need to subdue this burden, Mubarak agreed to this IMF plan to lower the country’s debt on the
terms that the IMF and World Bank agreed to cancel half. As in Tunisia, the macroeconomic
reforms that took place following the execution of the international finance institutions’
guidelines were praised. Egypt was seen to be improving its economic position. The structural
changes which were taken by Mubarak while outwardly effective, did little for Egyptians.
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While the macroeconomic environment was seen to be improving in both Tunisia and
Egypt, the structural reforms were not enough to help the people, especially those in the lower
classes of society. Many of the policies put in place by both leaders were in hopes to eliminate
the increasing state debt. Therefore, the economic changes were meant to benefit the
government and their economic struggle for the state rather than the people. Ultimately, in both
states, this brought about a great class divide. The elite continued to benefit from these
economic changes, but the growing rift is what ultimately brought the people to the streets.
Public Sector Consequences
The economic dead ends came from an economy largely based on external income in the
form of tourism, FDI, aid, and remittances. Unfortunately, with an economy receiving the
majority of its income and developments from international parties, the majority of people would
not come to see a substantial benefit from this. Despite the major changes that Ben Ali
undertook during his period in office and the improving macroeconomic outlook, Tunisia still
has a small private sector. While the market opened up over the past twenty five years, bringing
in substantial FDI, from the inside it was increasingly difficult for entrepreneurs and small and
medium enterprises (SMEs) to thrive. The sector for private businesses did increase over the
past decade due to reforms taken on by Ben Ali, yet much of this exists in an informal manner or
more marginalized sectors that do not produce high-level wages. The public sector of Tunisia
controls “energy and utilities… banking and mining… and communications…”and private sector
companies are mostly involved in “agriculture, manufacturing, construction... trade… business
services, transport and tourism,” all which can generally only provide relatively low income jobs
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through small companies.88 Additionally, besides the more trivial jobs generally supplied by the
private sector, Tunisian law has put forth various regulations that made it difficult for employees
who had previously worked for the private sector to enter the public sector. The private sector is
often more insecure for employers than if they work for a public sector job. On top of this, lower
wages have created an undesirable working environment for job seekers. If possible, they will
choose to wait for a secure and higher wage public sector job. This disparity between the private
and public sector has been caused by the regulations put forth by the Tunisian government,
making it rather difficult to open a business and therefore putting people in the position to
organize informal enterprises in which they can avoid these bureaucratic steps and taxes.
However, a business formed outside the formal sector and abiding by these procedures cannot
give high wages and the quality of work is usually more menial. Additionally, with the type of
foreign investment that Ben Ali brought to Tunisia, many European countries have started
outsourcing, “set[ting] up assembly shops that provide low-skilled jobs rather than building a
growing economic base that could expand the country’s technological base and workers’
professional skills.”89 Unfortunately for the majority of Tunisians these steps towards liberalizing
the economy have not improved the quality of life.
While part of the IMF plan in both Egypt and Tunisia was meant to diminish the public
sector, this approach did not succeed. Although measures were taken to privatize previously
public companies, those involved were the country’s elite. In countries where the public sector
has been so ingrained, any effort to create a larger private sector will not be straightforward. In
order to encourage entrepreneurs in these states, there needs to be an incentive system. The lack
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of motivation towards the development of the private sector is due to many factors in the
governments’ bureaucratic systems. This bureaucratic system has operated to provide
advantages for the elite class, while the residual classes are left to struggle through the public
sector workforce. With foreign aid and FDI making up a large percentage of the economies of
these states, there is little growth in the workforce, especially outside the welfare system of the
state. Due to excessive public intervention, over regulation and low human capital, the business
environment has deteriorated. Entrepreneurs in Egypt spend close to 35% of their time solving
problems related to government bureaucracies.90 Due to the difficulty of entering the business
world caused by government regulations, approximately 45% of the total Egyptian labor force is
in the informal urban sector.91 This is a similar problem with the private sector in Tunisia,
indicating a need for the separation of business and politics. The deteriorating public sector
unfortunately has not lead to an improved private sector, leaving both segments in decline.
Job Acquisition
The issues of the private and public sector highlight the soaring unemployment rates in
Tunisia. The unemployment exists largely within the educated population who do not wish to
participate in the private sector because they do not require the skills a university student would
have attained; yet public sector employment is equally demotivating. SME’s in Tunisia yield
approximately one-third of the total workforce, yet the smaller the company the more likely that
it has not been induced into the formal sector which creates poor conditions for workers. Yet the
smallest enterprises account for the majority. All across the MENA, the youth bulge has been
studied. Currently, the number of youth that are looking for employment far exceeds the number
of jobs that exist in Tunisia. This problem will only be exacerbated over the coming years,
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which is why economic reform is critical. The SME’s within the informal system cannot be
sustained and cannot be expected to provide jobs for the large number of educated youth that are
being placed into the labor force every year. The improving educational system and higher
number of university students coming out of the schools every year is exaggerating the disparity
between employable workers and available jobs. The demographic for which jobs have been
created in Tunisia does not help those who are currently searching for jobs. In following through
on economic reforms over the past two decades, Ben Ali left a huge segment of society
abandoned. The rate of unemployment for Tunisian youth with a university education is 40%
while for those who did not achieve this level of education, the unemployment rate is 24%.
Although the education in Tunisia has been improving and has high graduate levels amongst
countries in the MENA, seventy two out of one hundred have not finished secondary school,
only thirteen of these have graduated from high school, six have some sort of vocational training,
and nine will have a college degree.92 As education levels in Tunisia improve and there is a
continued high level of youth entering the workforce each year, jobs must be created in more
sectors compatible with the training received by educated youth.
Egypt has an extremely poor quality of education, not only in terms of the teaching, but
also in acquiring an appropriate education in order to gain capabilities that will provide them
with more adept knowledge relevant within the job atmosphere. They have ranked almost dead
last in the World Economic Forum’s (WEF) rating of the quality of the education system at 141
out of 14493. In response to the shortcomings of employment, Mubarak increased the public
sector further. For some, this was seen as a blessing because of higher pay and more benefits,
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just as in Tunisia. Currently in Egypt, 27% of those between the ages of eighteen and twentynine have not completed elementary education. Within this, 17% had dropped out of school and
10% never even enrolled.94 Educating the youth so that they have the skillset to enter the
workforce is of utmost importance, and is greatly lacking in Egypt. Unfortunately for Egyptians,
over the past decade, the government diminished the value of education. In 2005, the
government devoted 4.8% of the GDP on education, and in three years, this was slashed to
3.8%.95 Even with an improvement of education, if the overall climate for the private sector
does not experience a change, this cannot provide sufficient benefits and tackle unemployment
rates, especially with only .21% of the GDP being invested into research and development.96 In
both states, harmonization between education and the job sector is critically needed so that those
who are educated can work in an appropriate field.
Although similar disparities exist between the rates of education in both Tunisia and
Egypt, Tunisia does have a stronger education system than Egypt. The WEF rated Tunisia at
seventy-three out of one hundred and forty four for higher education and training while Egypt
ranks a low one hundred and eleven out of one hundred and forty four for the same variable.97
Ranked around the middle of the pack, it is clear that Tunisia has invested more in the education
of its people as Egypt continues to struggle.
Additionally, it is considerably more difficult for women to hold a strong position in the
workforce. Gender roles are still significant, with many upholding the view that women belong
at home to tend to the children. On top of this, it is often difficult in Egypt for those who choose
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to wear a hijab to enter the workforce, and they are often required to remove it in order to
maintain a position. Tunisia has come considerably further in terms of women’s rights under
Ben Ali, promoting a stronger female presence in the workforce than in Egypt.
Equally Unequal
Reforms that were put in place by Ben Ali did serve as beneficial to some Tunisians.
However, this only increased the gap between the classes and functioned to support his cronies
and the elite Tunisians leaving the rest of the population to face hardships with dismal living
conditions. According to reports, “estimates suggest that the Ben Ali family controlled
approximately a third of the Tunisian economy.”98 This assessment is approximately equal to
the military’s stake in the Egyptian economy. With one segment controlling such a sizeable
amount of the economy, the disparities that existed between those that were close to the regime
and those far from it are even more apparent. Inequality through these economic reforms was
inevitable after years of ignoring the majority of the population. The uprising in Tunisia began
from the rural cities of Tunisia after the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, a vendor
working in the informal sector of the economy selling local produce from a cart. After refusing
to pay a bribe to the corrupt police and being humiliated by their harassment, his response
ignited a fire amongst those across the country who had similar experiences and were subjected
to the dismal life Ben Ali was unable to alleviate. The poverty levels and inequality experienced
by many Tunisians was what ultimately brought them to the streets. The economic reforms did
not help their lifestyle, and they became fed up with the hardships continually facing them.
Tunisia’s Gini Coefficient which measures the inequality in a country was 36.06 in 2010 before
the uprisings, making it the sixty-second most unequal country. While this number makes it seem
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as though the inequality in Tunisia was not so severe, this is due in large part to the larger middle
class.99 Even with this large middle class, more impressive than other MENA countries, the
poverty and wealth gaps were felt largely due to increasing unemployment rates. Despite being
initiated with the rural poor in Tunisia, the revolution soon transferred to a more middle class
conflict. With the educated population and youth who would be searching for jobs coming to the
forefront of the Arab Spring, this conflict largely became an issue with different sectors of the
population. A need for financial and job security across every class division was at the forefront
of Tunisian’s objectives. Due to the unemployment rates and gap between supply and demand
for jobs, there exists a struggle to survive and maintain livable conditions for even the middle
class.
While there have been strategies by governments put in place to help the poor live within
their means, these have not aided in providing a way for the poor to escape impoverished
lifestyle. The programs put in place by the government kept the poor people poor while making
the elite classes, often those with personal connections to the regime, even wealthier. The low
human development rates in Egypt were a severe trigger for the revolution. With the everincreasing income gap that exists in Egypt, in 2008, only a few years before the revolution, the
GINI coefficient was 30.8, actually making it appear to be more equal than Tunisia.100
Unfortunately, the low GINI coefficient is not as telling of a low income gap in Egypt, instead
pointing to the fact that everyone is more equally living at lower levels of poverty. In 2011, it
was reported that Tunisia was the 62nd most unequal country in the world and Egypt the 90th
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most unequal.101 Tunisia and Egypt both apparently had higher rates of inequality in the year of
these revolutions. Growing inequality was a huge motivator behind the protesters desire to
remove Ben Ali and Mubarak. By outwardly looking at numbers provided by economists, this
was not always clear. It is clear by looking deeper into each country that many suffered due to
economic policies that favored only a few within each regime.
A Deceptive GDP
Continual improvement in the GDP and a constant rate of growth over the years left
people believing that Tunisia and Egypt were becoming economically prosperous and that
reforms in place were thriving. Egypt’s GDP was noted as improving over the past decade under
Mubarak. In 2004, it was 4.1%, increasing massively to 7.1% in 2007, and again to 7.2% in
2008, although a steep drop back down to 4.7% in 2009 was cause for concern despite seeming
to get back on track in 2010 with a GDP growth of 5.1%. Although the growth of the GDP in
Egypt was stable for the past decade, as we have seen, this did not signify any income growth for
many sectors of the working population.
The low GDPs of the Middle East, especially in non-oil countries, will improve with new
business ventures available to the vast majority rather than a select elite. It should be a goal for
the new governments to preserve the citizens who are educated and driven within the state rather
than forcing them to move to a country with greater prospects and possibilities. Just as the GINI
coefficient can be largely deceptive to someone looking only at numbers, a growing GDP
indicated to many that these two countries were on track.
Transition Economies
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Three years since the onset of protests over the poor living standards and economic
opportunities in Tunisia and Egypt, not much has been achieved to improve the situation. In
fact, most transformations have not produced opportune results. In Egypt, the year of the
revolution, the improving GDP rate dropped the furthest in years to a measly 1.8%.102 Tunisia
performed somewhat better than Egypt with a GDP growth rate of 2.7%.103 It has been clear that
the revolutions in both countries drastically affected their economies, and that the people expect
great results from new democratically elected leaders. The most current GDP per capita of
Tunisia is 4,345 USD, and for Egypt 3,226 USD.104 This is up from 3,852 and 2,450
respectively prior to the removal of Ben Ali and Mubarak.105 Although there has been an overall
increase in GDP per capita, neither interim government has implemented policies to allow for an
economic upturn overall since the Arab Spring. Due to the politically unstable regimes
following the 2011 ousters, FDI decreased as well as tourism, two major sectors for both
economies. Unemployment rates have risen continuing to burden the citizens in Egypt and
Tunisia. In both states, reactions by the people were observed over the declining economies and
little hope for improvement. Tunisian citizens largely blamed failed economic policies and a
declining economy on Ennahda, a large motivation behind the transfer of power to a technocratic
government in early 2014 along with the deaths of political opposition leaders attributed to
Islamists. In Egypt, government failings also lead the people to demand that Morsi be removed
from his post, regardless of being the first lawfully elected leader in Egypt. Both nations forced
the incumbents out of office due to the declining confidence of the state and the direction taken
after 2011. Yet one important factor set these two countries apart. In Egypt, the Muslim
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Brotherhood’s Morsi refused the peoples protests asking him to step down from power, claiming
his electoral legitimacy was most important above all. He did not leave his office without a
major struggle, which lead the Egyptian military into the revolution once again. In Tunisia,
Ennahda’s distinct approach not only brought the country to a smooth power transfer completely
in the hands of civil society, but also has allowed Ennahda to remain a major front-runner for
future elections.
Conclusions
Through examples of countries such as Turkey and Brazil that have followed plans
brought about by the IMF, it is possible to see how the intended reforms can improve a country’s
economy. Both of these states have succeeded dramatically over the past decade having
important global economies that are being watched around the world. This puts forth the issue
that it was not the set of reforms that were to take place, but how Ben Ali and Mubarak instituted
these policies to give themselves and their cronies an advantage. Although in examining the
economic reforms taken by both Ben Ali and Mubarak along with the reasons that these
countries came towards their uprisings contain similar facets, various differences exist. While
Tunisia was often hailed as being the most diverse economic country in the region prior to the
revolution, they were by no means a success story. The variation of the GDP between both
countries however, is not great enough to prove that one country would benefit democratically
because of this factor. In Guillermo O'Donnell's work on democratization, economic problems
can also lead to the collapse of democracy as seen in Brazil and Argentina during the 1960s. The
revolution and transition process in Tunisia and Egypt has thus far not lead to any economic
improvement. Should this continue, with new regimes failing to realize a policy that will benefit
the citizens and their quality of life, this may occur in Tunisia or Egypt. However, Tunisia's
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larger middle class and more educated society does point more to its ability to transition towards
a democracy. This is the primary economic difference that exists between Tunisia and Egypt.
With a strong citizen base in Tunisia, more qualified choices can be made, and the middle class
will have a more substantial voice. The development of human capital in these states will lead to
a more educated labor force and superior environment for politics and business.
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5- Civil Society:
Constraint vs. Control
Throughout the period in which Ben Ali controlled the repressive Tunisian regime, civil
society was inhibited and constant efforts were made in order to undermine any political
aspirations of the people. Political debate was therefore essentially nonexistent and the
formation of social movements was an arduous task. Under his dictatorship, elections took
place, yet participation was blatantly manipulated in order to ensure his continual leadership.
Despite discouraging the growth of civil society particularly in a political and religious manner,
and attempting to block any ideologies that promoted dissolution of the regime, Tunisia's civil
society in the wake of its revolution managed to successfully structure policies in order to move
the state towards a path of democracy. While there were setbacks along the way, social
movements did not cease to voice their opinions in an attempt to bring Tunisia towards its vision
for the future. How did Tunisia manage to achieve this inclusive environment during its
transition despite years of repressed civil society similar to other authoritarian states? The first
element epitomizing in what manner Tunisia's civil society was better positioned to take part in
the transition was through its economy. A more educated population in addition to a more
substantial middle class has attributed greatly to the strength of its civil society during this time.
This chapter will continue to examine other factors that played a role in developing the
atmosphere for Tunisia's civil society to enter into politics while Egypt’s civil society failed.
What is Civil Society and How Essential is its Role?
Definitions concerning the makeup of civil society can range greatly. A commonly noted
definition of civil society from the World Bank is: “the wide array of non-governmental and notfor-profit organizations that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of
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their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic
considerations…[including] community groups, NGOs, labour unions, indigenous groups,
charitable organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, and
foundations.”106 While political parties do not fall within the lines of civil society organizations,
they do have a relationship. In most cases, a civil society organization represents a group
autonomous from the states. This is not the case in Tunisia or Egypt. Additionally, because of
the lack of political participation in these undemocratic states, political parties were
underdeveloped. Often times, it was civil society organizations that attempted to form political
parties, as there was not enough desire for a party to develop outside of this circumference since
no political legitimacy would arise.
Within this, upon the opening of political regulations, we can see the development of the
Muslim Brotherhood, Ennahda as religious movements shifting into political parties. Despite
organizing political parties, Muslim Brotherhood and Ennahda continued to exist in parallel as
civil society organizations. In general, due to the authoritarian makeup of the regimes in these
countries, civil society organizations were more often than not involved with the government.
Tight regulations and management over these organizations meant that leaders had a hand in all
aspects of society in order to constrict their abilities and ensure that these groups did not intend
to object to the regime. Generally, it was religious movements that managed to stave off any
integration with the regime due to extreme actions taken against these organizations in its place.
However, this allowed the Muslim Brotherhood and Ennahda to develop in a distinct way from
other civil society organizations. Overall, within these states, the line between political parties
and civil society organizations can become muddled and intersections exist.
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Over the past decade in Egypt, despite political repression and low institutionalization,
social movements were gaining momentum and civil society became more prevalent. This came
about through several measures. The first aspect of this was due in part to the liberalization
policies of Mubarak. Many professional syndicates were restructured in the 1990s as a place for
workers to organize collectively. Secondly, the opening of the parliamentary elections in which
Muslim Brotherhood members were allowed to participate as independents greatly changed the
scope of civil society in Egypt. Despite running on an independent political platform, it was
never concealed that these contestants were part of the Brotherhood. This change in the electoral
policy, allowing Egyptians to witness the possibility of other parties coming to power greatly
shifted the ideology of civil society. Additionally, within the past decade, as economic
conditions began declining, forsaking many to a life of poverty in which they would struggle to
find jobs, revolts became intensified as Egyptians hoped to discredit Mubarak’s rule. Even
within the evolving compass of civil society, eventually, we observed civil society’s inability to
take over Egypt’s transition.
The importance of a prolific civil society has long been studied for its position in
transition, and the cases of Tunisia and Egypt continue to demonstrate its significance. A
developed civil society has a strong impact on political parties and political formation, and is
seen as an increasingly important agent for promoting good governance like
transparency, effectiveness, openness, responsiveness and accountability. Civil
society can further good governance, first, by policy analysis and advocacy;
second, by regulation and monitoring of state performance and the action and
behavior of public officials; third, by building social capital and enabling citizens
to identify and articulate their values, beliefs, civic norms and democratic
practices; fourth, by mobilizing particular constituencies, particularly the
vulnerable and marginalized sections of masses, to participate more fully in
politics and public affairs; and fifth, by development work to improve the wellbeing of their own and other communities.107
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Throughout the years prior to the Arab Spring, it was evident to many scholars that Egypt lacked
an abundant civil society.108 While Tunisia had a developed civil society that followed secular
lines, the Muslim Brotherhood and other religious organizations control a significant portion of
civil society organizations within Egypt.
The impartiality of organizations within Tunisia such as the UGTT, which played a major
part in the overthrow of Ben Ali and the subsequent steps towards founding a new government,
gave them a broader and encompassing sphere of influence. In contrast with this, as the Muslim
Brotherhood seeped into essentially all major organizations, civil society overall did not benefit
and instead became severely hindered and one sided. While this is not to say that civil society
does not exist in Egypt, rather, through the multitude of civil society organizations that have
formed, their structure and ideologies remain weak. This is in part due to the suppression of civil
society by the government through legislative and forceful means, and in part due to the
overarching reach of the Muslim Brotherhood. Due to the linkages between civil society and
political parties especially within the environment of an authoritarian nation, this chapter will
discuss both segments. Civil society may have a hand in influencing political parties, but in
democratic states, political parties do not have a place in civil society.
While religious movements played a pronounced part in civil society both in Egypt and
Tunisia, it was their secular civil societies that were greatly lacking. Islamist movements were
able to seek support through lower bases of society by providing them with education,
healthcare, and provisions through the lowest classes that the government often omitted from
their new policies. Through this, Islamists expanded over the past decades in these nations while
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secular civil societies did not gain enough support to grow. The secular civil society was often
sparse and incohesive in their ideologies. The foundations of Ennahda and the Muslim
Brotherhood on the other hand were much more organized and efficient. In Tunisia, Bourguiba
and Ben Ali both placed great importance on the secularization of society and put in place many
policies to ensure that society would not be as religious. This more centrist state policy in
Tunisia created a greater space for its secular civil society to grow and create greater equilibrium
between religious and secular civil organizations. This did not exist in Egypt.
Political Contestation Through Artificial Pluralism
Through the process of political contestation in both Egypt and Tunisia, it is possible to
witness further, the repression of Egyptian and Tunisian civil society. Due to the largely
controlled political process, overall knowledge in the field was not developed. Previous
political repression has greatly inhibited the understanding of the political process during the
transition. The control each leader had over the electoral process limited the influence of civil
society by ensuring that votes were not counted properly and dis-incentivizing citizens to
participate. In general, a relationship should exist between civil society and political parties in
order to ensure that the desires of civil society are met.
Ben Ali arranged presidential and legislative elections throughout his presidency that
were controlled by himself and his party. In 1987, Ben Ali made a move towards the
legalization of various political parties that granted him an initial appeal amongst many
opposition groups. He even made preliminary indications that the Ennahda party could be
legalized.109 In 1989, Ben Ali allowed members of Ennahda to run in parliamentary elections

109

Emad Eldin Shahin. “Tunisia’s Renaissance Party: The Rise and Repression of an Islamic
Movement.” Middle East Insight, (1995), 33.
66

where they earned 14.1% of the seats. As a result of this triumph, Ben Ali banned Ennahda.110
Through gearing his policies towards political liberalization, accompanied by his observance of
various religious practices that Bourguiba had actively avoided, he originally fostered a
persuasive personal image that appealed to many Tunisians. In 1994, as Ben Ali first began the
process of institutionalizing presidential elections, there was hope that pluralism would indeed
occur.111 Nonetheless, he insisted on a separation of religion and state politics, which removed
any genuine hope for Islamists. True progress towards democratization was avoided, as the
regime would eventually prevent organized election procedures from taking place. The constant
control and overriding of any political party attempting to make gains under his government
created a great constraint over this aspect of civil society to vote for politicians in an honest
election. Through the continual efforts composed by the incumbent regime, it is clear that any
attempt to pluralize the Tunisian political system was totally government controlled and did not
truly hope to allow for authentic political pluralism for Tunisian citizens.
Under Sadat, Egypt’s single party system was removed. He allowed for the legalization
of few opposition parties, but severe laws were set in place with regards to these newly formed
parties that did not truly allow for a plural government, similar to the case of Tunisia. Strict
regulations for the formation of political parties, including a ban on religious parties, made it
near impossible to register and kept the Muslim Brotherhood out of politics. Even with the
opening of the political sphere to competing parties, Sadat and Mubarak continually ensured the
reign of the NDP through electoral manipulation, giving little to no power to civil society. The
weakness of the legalized political parties did not only come from the severe regulations put in
place, but by their inability to develop clear ideologies and capacity to garner support from civil
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society. “In a country where only 25 percent of voters bother to cast their ballots,” it is obvious
that civil society had no strong commitment to elections and the politics of the NDP.112
In the 2005 parliamentary elections, the Muslim Brotherhood acquired an astounding
20% of the seats, and four additional parties won a total of 5% of the seats.113 While this was not
the first time the Brotherhood ran in parliamentary elections, this was the first time the result was
so considerable. The ability of the Muslim Brotherhood to compete with such an impressive
success rate demonstrates the strength that this movement has in comparison with many other
social movements. They were able to amass supporters and convince them to vote in
parliamentary elections to a degree that no opposition party could. The visible superiority of this
religious group within Egypt’s civil society shows their dominance and tenacity within a closed
system. Because of this result, the Muslim Brotherhood’s success sent a powerful message to
the presidency. Subsequently, the era for even insignificant political openness was closed. The
results of the parliamentary elections posed a threat to the Mubarak regime, demonstrating the
Muslim Brotherhood’s support from the people and their ability to attract followers while at the
same time indicating to other parties and groups that there may be potential. While many of the
parties which came out unsuccessfully from the elections blamed this on the authoritarian
approaches of the current regime, the Muslim Brotherhood managed to defy this, showing that
there was a possibility to gain political momentum.
The Muslim Brotherhood however possessed a strategy existing since the 1920s, through
which it gathered support over decades despite constant repression and the issues of legality that
often afflicted them to a greater degree than other social movements. The consequences of the
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unprecedented win by the Muslim Brotherhood brought about extreme anxiety for Mubarak and
as a result, the movement would once again be banned from taking part in elections and
illegalized. This reaction would not only remove the threat of the Muslim Brotherhood from
later elections and power seeking, but the severe actions taken out on many its members served
as a tacit warning to other political parties. The repression of the Mubarak regime was once
again restored after a fleeting moment of openness.
Regime Allies
Much of what we saw through the election process in Egypt and Tunisia follows the lines
of scholar Ellen Lust’s notion of “competitive clientelism” a practice largely existing in the
Middle East under authoritarian leaders who hoped to display a slightly plural society.114 Even
with a legislative branch in place integrating perceived powers, the parliament actually has no
ability to make changes within the government since the president maintains complete authority.
However, this ceremonial democratic process was used as an instrument for the elite to vie for
power, providing the regime with a way in which to maintain their power and ensure the
regime’s permanence. This competitive clientelism results in the appointment of elites to the
states power resources, in exchange for support and obedience from this certain subset of society.
With the distribution of this minimal power to chosen elites, selective assets were circulated that
would ensure the continued success within this subset in order to influence elite voters, swaying
them towards the ruling party.
As presented in the previous chapter on economic influences of regime change and how
varying factors of economic reform under Ben Ali and Mubarak affected the classes, we
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observed the elite benefiting from their rule. Through various factors, including the economic
profits given to a select portion of Tunisian society, Ben Ali managed to encourage a relationship
that proved to be an asset for his regime as well. The mutually beneficial relationship in which
the class of elites would continue to have security ensured their welfare, in return giving Ben Ali
a sense of reassurance owing to his management of a group that would back him. Encouraging
this strong group of citizens’ dependence on his regime was a major display of force by the Ben
Ali government. In accomplishing this, the most educated and prominent members of society
had significant reason to endorse Ben Ali and his party rather than attempting to broaden their
own political sphere and encourage a more democratic process.115 However, by focusing on the
maintenance of this resilient commitment of the elite class, Ben Ali inadvertently fostered an
environment for lower classes to emerge and become more aware of the shortcomings they
faced.
Egypt’s leaders had ties with a small group of business elite as well as with the military
throughout their years of rule. These two groups were among those which benefited from a
political relationship and had strong ties with the regime. While the military benefited greatly
economically from the closeness to the presidency, they were slowly losing their grasp at
political influence that they had under previous leadership. Due to this diminishing space for the
military within the government, we saw how they followed their own motives during the
revolution under the pretense of protecting the people. The business elite also saw great benefits
from Mubarak and his economic policies. The minority elite who enjoyed the biggest gains
during Mubarak’s tenure generated a profound divide within the nation, which brought the
distraught lower classes to the streets to demand a change in government. During the revolution
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however, the elite adopted a different position than expected. Besides direct members of the
ruling party who supported Mubarak throughout the weeks of protest, a significant number of
internal elite demanded Mubarak’s removal as well.116 The joining of the elite in protests
showed a unanimous opinion that Egyptians no longer accepted Mubarak, despite attempting to
use his personal ties as a way to manage protests. The united front against Mubarak consisted of
a fusion of a broad spectrum of classes. At this point in time, the unity and level of civic
engagement disillusioned many as to the strength of Egyptian civil society. Shortly thereafter,
the distrust and polarization across all sects of Egyptian civilian life returned. It would be a
tough endeavor to reconcile a notion of revolutionary unity that existed for a brief eighteen days.
The unfortunate fallout for Egypt has meant four years of conflict and disagreement leading back
to a potentially equal system of authoritarianism that existed under Mubarak.
Labor Organizations
The most prominent Tunisian labor union, the UGTT, which after its founding in 1946
played a major role as a nationalist movement during Tunisia's move towards independence from
France, also was amongst the leading associations during the initial Tunisian revolts of 2010
which led to the ousting of Ben Ali and the following years of transition attempts. The
perseverance of this labor union to invoke transformations throughout the past four years has
ultimately proved to be unrivaled within other Arab countries in the region. Without the
involvement of the UGTT, it is likely that the transition would have been unsuccessful from the
start. With pressure from the UGTT, Tunisians were able to push out the ruling regime’s
continuing presence in politics after Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia, and an arrangement was
structured with Ennahda in order to remove them from government in the early months of 2014.
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Where did the influence of the UGTT come from when Ben Ali and Bourguiba so extensively
subjugated the majority of civil society organizations?
While the UGTT is an independent union, not officially a state institution under its rule, a
considerable attachment of the UGTT with Ben Ali still existed. Beginning under Bourguiba's
rule, in 1978, strict impositions were placed on the organization in order to diminish the part it
took in protests. The regime's surveillance was apparent to those within the UGTT and other
civil society associations as “ruling-party people would approach you directly and let you know
what they had heard about your conversations with friends and colleagues. Ben Ali was spying
on us.” 117 Despite acting as an autonomous union under which the majority involvement was
through the public sector, the government, as with every aspect of civil society, did impart
influence over a portion of the union. This presence of government-affiliated cohorts within the
UGTT ultimately did not manifest in a show of support for Ben Ali. From the outset of protests
against Ben Ali in 2010, “the federation’s leadership... met at least five times during the mass
demonstrations and issued statements, the first of which demanded the immediate release of
political prisoners. When the regime began to kill protesters, the stance of the federation
shifted.”118 Divisions within the UGTT were overshadowed during the revolution when the
UGTT eventually wholly sided with the opposition. By gaining significant backing from this
major union, Tunisia was able to experience a transition process with a strong and organized
force.
In the wake of the revolution, the UGTT formed the National Council for the Protection
of the Revolution, which would serve as a balancing medium to ensure the goals of the
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revolution were upheld and the people had a space for national dialogue. Again in 2013, when
the smooth transition began to falter after the assassination of Chokri Belaid, the UGTT aligned
with three other movements to establish a newly accepted road map. This union included the
employers union (UTICA), the Tunisian Bar Association, and the Human Rights League
(LTDH).119 The compilation of these groups continued to ensure that Tunisians would formulate
a plan accepted by a broad spectrum of parties and individuals.
The convergence of workers from a broad spectrum of Tunisian society presented an
active space for organization and ideological discussion. The UGTT has "a branch in every
province as well as nineteen organized by activity, it penetrates society down to the grass roots.
Its economic clout, together with extensive mediating and negotiating experience acquired
through collective bargaining" proved valuable in the experience of the Tunisian revolution and
transition.120 While their members include approximately 5% of Tunisia's population, the extent
of their reach is only comparable with that of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.121 The crosssector focus of the UGTT allowed it to be a pacifying force throughout the revolution without
pursuing solely self-serving interests as was witnessed in Egypt's military. The ability of the
UGTT to bring various groups to consensus demonstrates their unrivaled ability to influence the
transition towards democracy.
The Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF), unlike that of Tunisia's UGTT, was
officially state run and provided the government a way to manage labor parties and groups
through its own cronies. Used as a puppet of Mubarak and previous leaders of Egypt, the ETUF
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assisted the government in suppressing attempted riots and block freedom of expression within
various labor classes. According to Hossam El-Hamalawy, an, Egyptian journalist who focuses
his work on labor affairs, “it [was] a federation of thugs, thieves and appointed government
bureaucrats who have helped to sabotage the labour movement and deny the Egyptian working
class any chance to mobilise for many decades.”122 Officially, the ETUF was intended as the
only source for labor activism in Egypt, however, over the past decade, the worsening economic
climate gave rise to an exacerbated motivation for other labor organizations to strike and protest
the regime. Upon the removal of Mubarak from office, many demanded that the ETUF be
dismantled due to a lack of trust in addition to aspiring to manage any professional associations
and labor organizations without constant supervision.123
For decades, professional syndicates were also under the authority of the government and
closely monitored. However, in the early 1980s, the Muslim Brotherhood developed an
increasing influence over a large number of the twenty-two existing syndicates in Egypt. As
Mubarak made attempts to introduce policies of economic liberalization, there was a vacillating
atmosphere for political openings. The Muslim Brotherhood’s presence at the head of five major
syndicates including those of doctors, engineers, pharmacists and lawyers was an impressive role
to take on under the authoritarian regime. The state’s exertion of power over syndicates came
about in various ways, first, by requiring candidates be a member of the National Union and also
with the ability of the president to abolish any syndicate at his will.124 The enforcement of many

122

Jack Shenker. “Hosni Mubarak's Puppet Trade Union Federation Dismantled.” The Guardian,
(2011).
123
Ibid.
124
Ninette S. Fahmy. “The Performance of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egyptian Syndicates: An
Alternative Formula for Reform?” The Middle East Institute, (1998), 558.
74

restrictions on these syndicates created an environment lacking much cohesiveness or power.
Through this, the ultimate goal of President Mubarak was achieved.
While it was clear that civil society was suffering under the leadership of all previous
regimes, the Muslim Brotherhood managed to change the scene. Altering the dynamics of the
associations instead made them more religiously focused. However, even with the
implementation of Muslim Brotherhood members into many of these syndicates, they were all
equally disorganized and unable to come to cohesive agreements. The capacity of these groups
to aggregate and articulate their interests was immensely flawed. Although civil society did not
become more formidable through their role in these syndicates, there was clearly a shift in
ideologies given the power of the Islamists. From examining these professional associations, it
is possible to observe the outline of the state and the Muslim Brotherhood in civil society. Many
parts of civil society that had the means to move away from government control were often
ceded to the Muslim Brotherhood. Since Egypt’s ousting of Mubarak, it has become more
evident how this polarizing control over civil society has affected the framework for transition.
The Foundation of Political Upheavals
2008 marked the first major revolts under Ben Ali's leadership. The mobilization of the
lower class to protest unemployment, low wages, and rising costs was the largest since the bread
riots under Bourguiba in 1984.125 As with the prior riots against Tunisia's government, the
UGTT provided an organizational space for civil society to arrange procedures for confronting
the government. Marginalization of the working class occurred during various economic
reforms, which only diminished their chances for success. Blossoming from the rural city of
Gafsa, awareness over the revolts spread to other nearby areas and the riots turned more violent.
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However, because of the relatively localized area in which the revolts took place, this limited
scope did not allow for a major change.126 Gafsa, a mining town on the border of Tunisia and
Algeria, had for years been a major source of employment. The collection of phosphate in this
area gradually declined since Ben Ali's economic restructuring plans, leading to the loss of many
jobs. Unemployment rates soared way above the national average of 14% up to 38% in the
mining city of Moularés.127 With the globally increasing food prices due to the world economic
crisis, food riots were witnessed across the Arab world. An increase in broad dissatisfaction
amongst citizens in various sectors led to incremental protests displaying animosity towards the
regimes in place. While the 2008 riots in these states did not lead to a revolution, the years
succeeding caused triggers for the population to come out in an explosive protest movement
greater than any previously witnessed. Extremely harsh responses from the police forces against
those who protested along with the many who were put on trial cut the riots short, yet ultimately
did not prevent Tunisians from once again making the decision to demand reform in 2011.
In 2004, the Kifaya movement was among the first to openly demand a change in
government, accusing Mubarak of planning to install his son Gamal Mubarak as his successor.
The group's moniker is simple, kifaya, an Arabic word translating to "enough," expressed their
clear-cut motivation behind its formation. The members who formed this group had enough of
Mubarak and his dictatorship. Due to the reemergence of a declining political atmosphere during
the 1990s due to Mubarak's fear of Islamists and political opposition gaining momentum,
oppression increased. The movement was a consolidation of various political groups who hoped
to serve the will of the people. Marking a momentous shift in the focus of most who solely
appealed to the regime to make changes from within, the Kifaya movement sought a greater feat.
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The complete removal of Mubarak and his family from rule in Egypt showed the progressive
stance of the group and the developing dissatisfaction of Egyptians. Their demonstration against
Mubarak is celebrated as the first of its kind in Egypt. Through the emergence of Kifaya, a
transformation of Egyptian political ideologies began. Although it lost momentum and
ultimately disappeared from the scene in 2006, the new networks they created endured.128 In
forming an environment in which all Egyptians can simply understand and identify with Kifaya’s
hopes, this contributed to the success of future strikes against Mubarak.
Protests on April 6, 2008 mark another remarkable historical moment against the
Mubarak government. While the ETUF attempted to squash the protests, they were unsuccessful
in preventing small Egyptian labor movements from coming to the streets. Low wages along
with rising prices of basic goods for consumption, especially bread, meant Egyptians were facing
great hardships. Smaller protests in 2006 and 2007 grew over the anguish facing citizens all over
the country.129 With the precedent set by the Kifaya movement, people were gaining the strength
to petition the government and voice concerns over their living conditions. For many average
citizens, there was an everyday struggle to survive and deal with the worsening living conditions
provided by the government.
With the escalating workers revolts against the rising cost of living, the April 6th
Movement formed in order to organize popular protests that would reach a larger segment of
society and clearly illustrate the goals and demands of the demonstrations. A large portion of the
Egyptian population thrives off government subsidies; especially those that preserve bread prices
at a lower price. However, with the economic changes taking place under Mubarak, efforts were
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often made to remove or decrease subsidies. Bread is a staple for many Egyptians who live in
poverty as we witnessed during the Arab Spring in which the people's chants demanded bread
along with freedom and social justice.130 For this reason, the workers revolts in 2008 demanded
increased wages in parallel with the price shifts. The group began its calls to mobilize over
social media, becoming the first to utilize this new form of addressing those who were equally
dissatisfied. The youth movement was a supporter of democracy and openly called for the
removal of Mubarak. By using social media and encouraging supporters especially within the
younger generations, the group was able to reach out to a new subset of disenchanted Egyptians.
Since its foundation in 2008 as a step to support workers, the April 6th Movement’s scope has
expanded. The movement undertook a large role in the revolution ousting Mubarak, as well as
joining with Tamarod in demanding the removal of Morsi with help from the military.131
Once again in 2010, a new spark of protest and anger was bringing Egyptians to
outwardly display their discontent with Mubarak and his brutal regime. The momentum from
the "We are all Khaled Said" Facebook page, established to demonstrate the sickening methods
taken by the regime's policemen in order to preserve order, more than agitated Egyptians. After
Khaled Said was inhumanely murdered by members of the police force for allegedly possessing
evidence of police corruption, protests over the injustice he faced were an extension of internal
sentiment. Because Khaled Said was seen as an ordinary citizen, many were able to identify
with him, which lead to the high numbers following his cause. The massacre revived antigovernment sentiment by substantiating their judgment of the Mubarak regime. Severely
provoking Egyptians, they demonstrated all over the country, and with the continual diffusion of
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this Facebook page whose creator uploaded the disturbing photos of Said’s death and provided a
space for society to share thoughts and organize revolts. Throughout the year, the group
accumulated over 473,000 members and momentum did not end.132 The community that formed
around this basis was strong enough to maintain support throughout the year, continuing up to
the revolution. The amount of support gained by the Facebook page created in his honor showed
numbers far greater than that of the April 6th Movement in 2008 and ultimately was seen as an
icon for the Egyptian people.
Banding together to achieve a first common goal proved to be relatively straightforward
in Egypt, especially after witnessing the revolution that toppled Ben Ali in Tunisia. Yet once
this primary goal was achieved, the united front that was made possible because of social media
became lost. There was no agreement in regards to accomplishing an end goal. While Egyptians
still seemed to want the same outcome, the polarized civil society dividing religious and secular
groups, and pro-military and anti-military groups, returned to the foreground as it had in years
past. No longer did their united front exist. The strong Egyptian population became lost and the
military took its new position at the helm by assuming the role as Egypt’s decision maker, a
position that no civil society organization was strong enough to undertake. A country whose
people manage to come together for a total of eighteen days before disengaging with one another
is ultimately not strong enough to produce lasting and effective results. While people did
continue in attempts to remove the military, their efforts were not nearly as imperative as those
of the initial ouster until the beginning of 2012.
Social Movements through Media
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The economic trigger that in the subsequent years spurred the larger scale revolts was due
in a large part to the increasing field of social media. During the period prior to the 2010 and
2011 uprisings, the spread of discontent was accelerated through social media through the
dissemination of images and news regarding Mohamed Bouazizi in Tunisia and Khaled Said in
Egypt. In both cases, these depictions exposed the corruption of the government and a need for
change. Through the passage of these images and ideas with the use of social media, displays of
dissatisfaction with the government spread like wildfire. These nations quickly began to protest,
and consequently brought about the phase of the Arab Spring through the use of media sources,
including blogs, Facebook, news outlets, videos, and text messages. Additionally, with the
release of WikiLeaks, people were given a chance to see in even greater detail the corruption of
the regime that took place behind closed doors.133 Although the regimes attempted to block
these sources that allowed for the extension of ideas, the people were not stopped.
Tunisia's media under Ben Ali was one of the most restricted in the region. Operating
through his police state, traditional media sources of news were constantly monitored, as was
internet access and social media. Under his authority, “censorship and monitoring of the internet
was pervasive by the cyberpolice, known as Ammar 404.”134 “ ‘Ammar’ is actually the name
given to a branch of the ministry of interior that spied on citizens through social networks.”135
Access to restricted articles that discussed Ben Ali and his regime negatively was completely
blocked. Even books on the subject of politics were banned from Ben Ali’s Tunisia. The fear of
exposure was a constant threat to Ben Ali’s regime. Should people understand politics, they
would be more likely to find reason for his removal from office. Through the dispersal of
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information over the weeks of the revolution, his reasoning was apparent. Therefore his
commitment to monitoring use of the internet was constant and unrestrained. Beyond politically
affiliated media, religious books and sites were also concealed. This overwhelming control over
Tunisia’s broadcasting platforms was a significant measure for Ben Ali to control civil society in
a severe manner.
Media sources have long been repressed in Egypt as well. With tight government
controls determining what could be published and the practice of prosecuting anyone who wrote
defamatory words against the regime, freedom of expression was not experienced often. A large
percentage of the media in Egypt is state owned and articles were therefore presented according
to what the government chose. For a short period under Mubarak’s first years, the reins on
media were loosened slightly and the Muslim Brotherhood was even allowed to publish its own
newspaper, Al-Dawa.136 Yet like with many other aspects of liberalization during this period, it
was forced to end once again. Severe crackdowns, especially on Islamists took place during the
1990s and media continued to be closely monitored. The news received by Egyptians was very
one-sided and did not usually present accurate representations of events. The media was
commonly used to promote the government’s own image while vilifying the portrayal of other
groups.
With the boom of social media across various platforms, ideologies were more easily
conveyed between young Egyptians who employ this method of communication. Atrocities that
were once covered up by the regime were being spread across the web for anyone to witness.
This lead to a growing disgruntlement with Mubarak across lines that exceeded solely economic
problems faced within daily life. Through this heightened glimpse of issues that Egyptians were
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confronted with, social media has provided a space for groups to form and display their
dissatisfaction, and through this approach a wider range of the population could be reached.
Ideas were constantly being spread across Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, allowing for
Egyptians to band together in a way that was previously unfeasible. Convening to spread
awareness and unify Egyptians towards the achievement of a singular goal, their aim was to
remove Mubarak.
Due to the use of social media within both of these revolutions, many have labeled the
revolts as leaderless.137 With this constant promulgating of ideas, there was no singular leader
who told the people to go to the streets and protest. The accumulation of resentment towards
both regimes spurred this reaction, ultimately exhibiting a strong response and encouraging
others to join. Once facing a change, Tunisia managed to incorporate a leader through the UGTT
to stand at the helm of the transition. Egypt’s leaderless revolution remained this way due to its
lack of major social organizations. Although the upsurge in social media use seems to have
created a new environment for the formation of civil society groups to protest the government, it
is clear that within the years prior to each revolution, citizens were growing increasingly
discontent and already developing riots and protests against the regime. These major turning
points that increased social movement contestation against the government began to flourish over
these years. Major instances including the self-immolation of Bouazizi and the murder of
Khaled Said created enough of an outcry to cause citizens in both Egypt and Tunisia to gather in
mass protests that had previously been unequalled. This new motivation existed across class,
religious, and social backgrounds therefore allowing for greater mobilization across these two
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countries unlike the previous revolts in Gafsa or bread riots in Egypt, which were consolidated
within a singular segment of society.
Transformation and a Space for Growing Civil Engagement
Within the stage of transformation, Tunisia has made significant steps in the promotion of
civil society since removing the authoritarian presence. Since the eviction of Ben Ali, state
media was brought to a more prominent platform in which it is freer to publish articles focused
on politics. Books on politics are no longer banned, and the religious sphere is most certainly
expanding. Journalists have more freedom to a certain limit, and while libel is still grounds for
scrutiny, fewer cases have been presented since Ben Ali’s ouster.138 This is an indication of the
broad manner in which Ben Ali charged reporters with this offense, punishing them with fines
and imprisonment. Control over the internet has been released and “Ammar” is no longer a
security force in charge of it. New articles within Tunisia’s constitution have implemented laws
to provide freer reign for civil society organizations to form and exercise their rights
independently without constant government scrutiny. “Article 26 states that two or more
associations may establish an associations network; Article 29 that any network acquires legal
personality independent from the personality of its member associations; and Article 30 that the
network may accept branches of foreign associations in its membership.”139 Activism within
civil society is more supported and accepted within the transitional government, and efforts
continue to be made to support Tunisia’s growing civic environment. Civil society has been
central to Tunisia’s revolution and transition process and its proliferation will continue to aid in
encouraging democratic consolidation.
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Current controversy over the existence of civil society organizations, media and personal
freedoms continues to persist in Egypt. In Tunisia on the other hand, continued development of
freedoms within society is an important element of its transition. The uncontested elections
bringing President Sisi to power in Egypt during the past year in order to follow the military’s
roadmap to democracy has not democratized the country to any extent. With only one additional
candidate, Hamdeen Sabahi, there was no real contest for the 2014 elections. It was evident
prior to this election that Sisi would become Egypt’s new president, ultimately deserting Egypt’s
attempts at a civilian government. Discrepancies over privileges that are generally seen to
accompany a democratic process have been at the forefront of major policy failures in Egypt.
Arrests of Al-Jazeera journalists, the subjection and illegality of the Muslim Brotherhood once
again, and the desire of the government to place continual control over citizens’ freedom of
speech exposes a similar environment to that of Egypt under Mubarak. With the clear role that
social media took during the revolution in uniting Egyptians, the government in Egypt is now
seeking to ban Facebook and Twitter. In a move that is stated to protect the state, citing
“security concerns and warn[ing] that the websites could be used as tools in intelligence plots
against the state,” this is a divisive move blocking personal freedom.140 Due to the continual
efforts to suppress Egyptian civil society, many indicators suggest that Egypt is not on the way to
democracy, rather taking a step backwards.141
In April 2014, the April 6th Movement was banned in Egypt after accusations of
espionage and defamation of the state.142 Although the group initially banded with the Tamarod
movement calling on the army remove Morsi from the presidency, they quickly altered their
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standpoint and came out as an anti-military force. In viewing the group as a threat to the
government and stability within the new regime, the state has managed to uphold its rigorous
demeanor by removing social organizations' ability to organize freely. On the contrary, the
Tamarod movement, which organized the initial protests against Morsi and appealed to the
military in order to have them successfully take Morsi and Muslim Brotherhood members out of
the government, continually supported the army and Sisi during the post-Morsi stage. Due to
their unwavering support of this transition period, the Tamarod movement was not forced from
existence and instead had higher hopes for its own entrance into government.
The circumstances in which Sisi was brought to power mimic that of Bouteflika in
Algeria in 1999. After fifteen years, we have seen Bouteflika change constitutional laws, control
media and stifle personal freedoms while remaining in power through events that were supposed
to democratize Algeria. While Sisi is only in his first term as president, this scenario is a
plausible one considering the blatant efforts he has made to silence civil society and continue on
the path of Mubarak. In addition, events since Mubarak’s downfall have only increased
divisions within Egypt. Since the 2011 revolution, the polarity of Egyptian society has become
greatly exaggerated and ever changing. From the Egyptian society as a whole against the
regime, to the Egyptian society against SCAF, to Islamists and secularists, pro-Morsi and antiMorsi, once again pro-military and anti-military, pro-roadmap and anti-roadmap, pro-Sisi and
anti-Sisi, there has been a never ending debate and requisite for Egyptians to choose a side.
Evident from Freedom House’s civil liberties indicator revealed in the introduction, Egypt still
has a long way to go in order to achieve its democratic goal.
Conclusions
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The past decade demonstrated a slow unraveling of Tunisian and Egyptian authoritarian
rule. With social movements slowly daring to oppose the regimes that censored their every
move, a new sense of determination was launched. Both regimes saw opposition groups
displaying anti-regime sentiment for years before the revolution and imparting this upon other
factions of civil society. New organizations were forged to guide the disgruntled citizens who
sought a better life. Recognizing the UGTT's manifestation as a major secular civil society actor
throughout Tunisia's history illuminates a major distinction between Tunisia and Egypt. While
facets of Tunisian society as a whole guided Tunisia’s transformation, Egypt's attempt to bring
about a democracy was controlled by only one side of its pluralized society, either Islamists or
the military. The past ten years of rule under Mubarak saw a growing sense of disengagement
from the regime as represented by an increase in organizations that openly opposed his regime.
Nonetheless, their development was incomparable to that of Tunisia's labor organizations which
developed over decades. Singular prominent actors were present during Egypt's revolution, yet
without any substantial reinforcement by an organization that was notorious to Egyptians, these
actors would not succeed alone.
Despite the existence of political parties in Egypt apart from the NDP, very few were
cohesive and overall enjoyed little support over the decades since their legalization. Their lack
of desire to pursue any major efforts to mobilize supporters due to a fear of prosecution from the
ruling party left Egypt with the strength of only two groups in the post-revolution arena. These
include the military, which has benefited from two hundred years of integration within the thread
of almost every aspect of Egyptian society and government, and the Muslim Brotherhood with
almost a century of producing a social outlet for Egyptians to shelter themselves from the
hardships afflicted by the regime. With very big shoes to fill, and little idea of who could
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successfully transform Egypt, these were the only two viable options amongst a society with
insufficient political knowledge. The scope and size of change needed to bring change to 85
million Egyptians, a large population with poor to no education, is insurmountable. Achieving
this feat requires a competence that neither the SCAF nor the Muslim Brotherhood was willing
to engage in.
While the presidents of Tunisia and Egypt both discouraged a prominent civil society
under their rule, Tunisia still managed to successfully deviate from the perceived norm of
underdeveloped civil society organizations existing under authoritarian rules. Similar scenarios
of social unrest occurred within the Tunisian experience, which saw continued protests after
former RCD member Mohamed Ghannoushi was brought to power and when Shafiq was put in
power in Egypt. Yet in Shafiq’s place, instead of the demanded technocratic government, SCAF
took his place. The pleas of Egyptians were not met, while those of Tunisians were. Egyptians
and Tunisians aspired to reach the same ultimate objective, yet it was demonstrated through
these events that Tunisia's civil society was more capable of ensuring a profitable outcome.
Again, when Egyptians demanded that Morsi be removed from his elected office, SCAF
took charge. While many Egyptians, excluding the Tamarod movement who organized initial
protests against Morsi, claimed that it was not their intention to have the army intervene in the
removal of Morsi during 2013 protests, it is unlikely that there was any other approach to
convince Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood to step down. Prior to military involvement in this
second grand uprising, a stalemate between protesters and Morsi did not indicate any signs of
dispersal. The movement of Egyptians pleading his departure was not going to alter the political
deadlock that protests brought about, and only a substantial entity could force the president’s
hand.
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The tremendous disparity between social movements in the Tunisian and Egyptian
transitions proved to be paramount in examining how democracy could be achieved. Through a
review of various social movements, Egypt actually displayed a larger dissatisfaction with
Mubarak over the years preceding his removal than Tunisia under Ben Ali. While the discontent
was apparent, the lack of unification and organization under a secular civil society organization
ultimately was not sufficient for Egypt to control its fate in the transition period. The evolution
of Egypt over the past one hundred years has centered largely on the military and the Muslim
Brotherhood. While new policies have changed the environment under which social movements
can function, it is those two structures that have been a focal point of all previous leaders. Where
Tunisia’s civil society managed to bridge the gap between organizations of varying interests,
Egyptian civil society failed.
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6- Islamists:
Polarization vs. Coordination
Intrinsic differences in civil society brought about distinctive responses to the ousters of
Ben Ali and Mubarak. Although authoritarian suppression burdened both Tunisian and Egyptian
citizens similarly, no secular and apolitical institution in Egypt could compare to the dominant
UGTT. Taking into account religious movements, the Tunisian Islamist party Ennahda and the
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood are two of the most influential and notorious social movements
within these countries. Both are comprised of members with diverse backgrounds, and have
succeeded in incorporating themselves into every class level. Where government policies often
failed to support lower class citizens, both of these religious movements succeeded in providing
social services to aid them. In delivering these services, both movements garnered respect and
an active backing from a vast array of people.
After decades of repression against Islamist groups in Egypt and Tunisia, the Arab Spring
marked a momentous occasion in which the Muslim Brotherhood and Ennahda were both
legalized and granted political representation. Through this burgeoning prospect of political
participation by two previously illegal religious movements, observers of the Arab Spring
became anxious over the possibility of an Islamic democracy, questioning the compatibility of
Islam with a moderate form of government. In response to this debate, moderation-inclusion
theory would suggest that because these two groups experienced illegality and brutality for
decades, this chance to enter politics would cause the Brotherhood and Ennahda to moderate
their policies in order to conserve their new positions. Albeit the resemblances of these two
major religious movements, the aftermath of the Islamists entrance into the political arena are
quite distinct. Ultimately, Ennahda has secured their space in Tunisian politics while the
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Brotherhood has once again been made illegal and labeled as terrorists by the new regime. This
chapter seeks to outline the variances in these two relatively moderate Islamist parties, which
brought them to contrasting results.
Ennahda’s Political Roots
Ennahda, founded by Rachid Ghannoushi, began as the Islamic Association in 1979 in
order to transform Tunisia’s religious forces into a sociopolitical movement.143 In the years prior
to the establishment of the Islamic Association, Ghannoushi began to invigorate the religious
atmosphere of Tunisia’s curtailed adherence to religion under Bourguiba. This resolve led him
to create a movement that would focus on the immense issues Tunisians faced living under a
deteriorating political and economic arena. The foundation of the Islamic Association
emphasized political freedoms and encouraged social activism. Obstacles that Ghannoushi
hoped to tackle included worker’s rights, job opportunities, wages, political participation, and the
conflict experienced between Westernization and Muslim cultural identity.144 The range of
issues addressed by Ghannoushi brought this Islamic movement support from the lower and
middle classes as well as the UGTT.
As Bourguiba briefly sought to liberalize the political scene in Tunisia, the Islamic
Association made the decision to form a political party, thus changing its name to the MTI.
However, Bourguiba did not legalize the party and instead Islamists faced a series of extensive
backlashes. Ghannoushi was imprisoned and the MTI persisted under a new leadership of Ali
Lareydh.145 During this period, the MTI experienced various contentions amongst members who
hoped extreme measures would be taken against the government, dividing them from the
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organization. As other more radical Islamist groups took action against Bourguiba’s regime, the
MTI was viewed as their equal, generating a perceived correlation between the MTI and the
Islamic Jihad along with other more extremist groups in Tunisia.146 This led to the government’s
continual resistance against the MTI.
Again, when Ben Ali took power, discussions of liberalization were made and Tunisians
foresaw a promising environment for political adjustment, the MTI changed its name a final time
so as to remove the blatant Islamic character of the party. However, the move to a more liberal
political environment did not proceed, and instead Ennahda endured twenty years as an illegal
movement in Tunisia. During this period, the majority of its members took refuge outside the
state, and Ghannoushi spent his exile in London.147 These moments spent abroad undoubtedly
left him with a more developed worldview, influencing decisions he would make during the
recent political transition.
Ennahda’s ideologies are considerably democratic in nature. Because Ghannoushi sought
to create an Islamist movement that dealt with pertinent and current issues facing Tunisia, he
hoped to eliminate the “passive (‘museum’) Islam,” he deemed many other Islamist
organizations focused on.148 In his early years, antiquated Islamic teachings had led him away
from religion, and instead Ghannoushi was a strong proponent of Arab Nationalism. Over years
of travel, study, and exploration Ghannoushi sensed that a more suitable interpretation of Islam
could be presented. In founding an “Islam that was alive,” Ghannoushi believed that he would
be able to influence a larger segment of Muslims.149 By focusing on contemporary issues,
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Ennahda’s dialogue and ideological background always included a democratic attitude.
Accordingly, Ghannoushi indicated that democracy provides a space to implement Islamic
tenants in which Sharia can set boundaries, but does not answer all problems of modern life.
Freedom, rule of law, and human rights are essential components to civilization and continue to
be an important focus for Ennahda.150 However, within this, Ghannoushi still believes that a reIslamization of society must occur, but these values must be reinterpreted and reapplied to the
present.151
Ghannoushi’s opinion--that the Quran and other religious records did not need to be
taken literally as they existed within a historic context--was very progressive. Throughout the
evolution of Ennahda into a political party, Ghannoushi’s ideologies have been studied for their
moderate stances. This regard of Ennahda as a moderate religious movement automatically
caused people to believe that they would be better suited for political participation. Nonetheless,
the party still conveys Islamic ideals, and given the opportunity would perhaps implement
Sharia.
Social Activism in the Muslim Brotherhood
Whereas Ennahda was founded as an Islamic revival movement that sought to embody
what was generally considered by Islamists as two separate worlds that could not coincide, Islam
and democracy, the Muslim Brotherhood, which was founded half a century prior, did not
develop substantial political policies until decades after its foundation. Under the guidance of
Hassan al-Banna, the Muslim Brotherhood was the epitome of the “museum Islam” that
Ghannoushi sought to avoid. While much of Ennahda’s organizational structure and social
activism is similar to the Muslim Brotherhood, as a more contemporary association, Ennahda’s
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ideology adopted a distinctly more modern perspective. The founding of the Muslim
Brotherhood occurred under Egypt’s monarchy and existed for over two decades before Egypt
experienced a new system of authoritarian governance. The decades between the foundation of
these movements and the environment under which they were established would inherently
produce a dichotomy in their ideologies.
The foundation of the Muslim Brotherhood under Hassan al-Banna was meant to bring
about religious reform to the increasingly secularized Egyptian society. Displeased with the
government and social transformations, which focused largely on the monarchy and British
presence in Egypt, al-Banna made it his mission to encourage the stimulation of Islam in Egypt
and Islamicize Egyptian culture.152 The Muslim Brotherhood began from a social base, with a
bottom up policy to reach its goals.153 In these early years, the Brotherhood also instituted a
military wing that fought in Palestinian revolts.154 Political discourse however was not
incorporated with his goal of proselytizing at the time. Since its inception, the Muslim
Brotherhood’s priorities remained in the social sphere.
The organization did express animosity towards the monarchy leading to the group’s
disbandment and the murder of Al-Banna. The displeased attitude of the Muslim Brotherhood
towards the existing government and its advocacy for the coup did not however imply the
development of a political stance. While members of the Brotherhood promoted the Free
Officers that brought about the Egyptian transition from monarchy, they ultimately became
equally unhappy with the nationalist ideologies instilled by Nasser. Tensions between the
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Muslim Brotherhood and Nasser’s government continued to grow over the following years,
escalating to the point of an assassination attempt on Nasser. In response, the Muslim
Brotherhood encountered extreme repression and illegalization that would set the precedent for
their state relations in decades to come.155
Within the period of repression under Nasser, the Muslim Brotherhood saw a
radicalization of its principles. Said Qutb a prominent Brotherhood figurehead, is attributed as
being the father of this more extreme movement.156 Yet with Sadat’s rise to power and
promotion of political and economic liberalization, which he used to appease Western nations, he
also encouraged a more tolerant disposition towards the Muslim Brotherhood. In this wave of
political openings and improved cooperation, the Muslim Brotherhood sought a new political
standpoint. At this time, it departed from its radicalized tactics. Although they attempted to
demonstrate openness to democracy and political liberalization, the political platform of the
Muslim Brotherhood remained overtly focused on religion. Within their developing platform,
women and non-Muslims would be excluded from entering the government.157 Nonetheless,
they “suggested that this was merely a position of the Brotherhood and therefore implied that the
exclusion need not be translated to law… they could accept a defeat on the matter as long as it
came through legitimate democratic procedures.”158 Despite this indication of their willingness
to moderate if coming through democratic means, the initial proposal is already in itself
undemocratic. However, as the Brotherhood was never given political power, it remained
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uncertain as to what actual policies they would implement. In June 2011, when the chairman of
the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) dismissed specific questions about
his party’s economic platform with a smile, saying that he “did not know much about the
economy,” it is possible to see that true democratic aspirations were not integral to the party.159
Despite this noncommittal attitude towards democracy, the movement has remained relatively
moderate. This becomes more apparent with the departure of Muslim Brotherhood members to
more extreme Islamist groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir due to the more lenient nature of the
Brotherhood’s policies.160
Through the Brotherhood’s history, the relevance of moderation theory is apparent in the
cyclical nature it took on within the Muslim Brotherhood. Initially the group began with an
apolitical stance, and involvement in the government was not their ultimate goal. Through this
period, the Brotherhood did not see huge opposition and existed solely in order to promulgate
Islam throughout Egypt and provide social services. Once they encountered repression from the
government, becoming viewed as an opposition force, they employed more extremist behaviors.
This transformation exemplifies the adverse effect of moderation theory; once the group was
suppressed, they became more radical. Subsequently, once the state began to liberalize under
Sadat and the Muslim Brotherhood had further opportunities to expand, they moderated their
stance once again, renouncing violent tactics. Hence, the group’s implementation into society
once again led them to moderate their stances, and even brought them into the political arena
epitomizing what scholars allude to in moderation theory. While attempts to formulate a
democratic political platform were feeble at best and did not actually result in a profound
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ideological adjustment for the Brotherhood, it is still evident that their changing status did
produce a significant effect on the process of moderation.
In addition to becoming more active within the political sphere and their development of
a political ideology during parliamentary elections, “the Brotherhood made efforts to join forces
with other opposition actors to develop a national platform for democratic reform and exert
meaningful pressure on the government to accept a greater degree of political competition and
pluralism.”161 This limited interaction reveals the moderation of the group’s policies, when the
movement needed to cooperate with other parties. This political involvement under which unity
partially occurred took place within an entirely distinct environment from the recent attempt at
democratic transition. Many of the group’s democratic ideologies depended on its attachment to
other political parties to fully be democratic, and it is evident that this collective space did not
develop within the transition. The power generated by the Muslim Brotherhood over generations
brought it out as a singular authority. Ultimately, when the Muslim Brotherhood came to play a
significant part in politics, the movement previously in opposition became the state’s majority
power holder and therefore moderation was not necessary.
Splinters within the Muslim Brotherhood
Through its development of a political ideology, the Muslim Brotherhood began to split
in the 1990s. The Brotherhood did not bother developing formal political institutions, policymaking procedures, and policy orientations that would come into effect beyond the realm of
religious ideologies. Due to the organization’s meager political position, many members
comprising of the middle generations did not acquiesce to the older traditionalists and their
perspective on current political issues. It was clear that there was no admirable effort made by
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older Brotherhood members to deliberate necessary political policies. In 1996, a separation
occurred in which followers of the Muslim Brotherhood renounced their membership in order to
form Al-Wasat, which hoped to be more politically inclusive than the Muslim Brotherhood.
According to one of the founders, Al-Wasat represented “a civic platform based on the Islamic
faith, which believes in pluralism and the alternation of power.”162 This group that branched off
from the Muslim Brotherhood showed the clear inclination of younger generations towards
democracy and a more attentive view of political preferences. Although the new party was still
founded on a religious platform, it was committed to succeeding as a more impartial and
inclusive party than the Brotherhood. Splinters within the Muslim Brotherhood indicate a
dissociation of principles that younger generations found to be more crucial than Islamicizing
society. While this modern approach aggravated older members, the move did not motivate
them to formulate any substantial political shifts within the organization. The prevailing
ideologies developed by younger generations of the Brotherhood demonstrate the significance of
the moment in history during which Ennahda and the Brotherhood were established.
Since the revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood has continued to cope with numerous
internal discrepancies. Various new organizations have spurred from within the Brotherhood’s
ranks. Like with the Wasat party, many of the youth were unhappy with the path of the
Brotherhood during elections, viewing their policies as ominous. This pre-revolution to post
revolution stage has shown a shift in the Brotherhood mentality. The continuing disengagement
from the Brotherhood indicates a transformation towards democratic policy among newer
members of the group and the knowledge that its antiquated policies could not be maintained. In
addition to the Wasat party, four newer parties were developed, including, the Al-Nahda party,
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the Peace and Development Party, the Exploration Party, and the Egyptian Current.163
Additionally, long time member Abdel Moneim Aboul Fatouh branched off from the movement
in order to run as a presidential candidate in the 2012 elections, continuing the Muslim
Brotherhoods political disenfranchisement from within its ranks.164 Within these new
constituencies, each took on its own program with regards to the value placed upon Islam and
democracy.
The Brotherhood’s weak attempts to merge both religion and politics, moderating Qutb’s
prior conclusion that there cannot be harmony between Islam and party politics failed. The
movement stated beliefs that democracy and Islam are in fact compatible, in order to substantiate
their involvement in politics.165 While the Brotherhood may have altered the earlier notions of
an Islamic state, in restructuring the role of rulers, religious scholars, sharia, women and
education, they did not incorporate true democratic policies. The choice between whether to
revert to a more basic premise of Islam, and implement Sharia at its harshest, or maintain a more
open society remained. Their political platform may have changed in order to maintain a place
within the transitional space, but intrinsic ideologies were not forgotten. It is clear that the
Brotherhood politically misrepresented their political party in order to appeal to Egyptian
citizens outside of the Islamic society.
Comparably Moderate Islamists
While the Muslim Brotherhood has continually transformed ideologies in order to fit
within the political current, Ennahda has endured with a singular opinion since it began as the
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Islamic Association. The inception of Ennahda within a newer atmosphere in which
authoritarianism, Westernization, and democracy were a clear impediment to any Islamic way of
life signified to Ghannoushi that he must find a find a way to enable his movement within these
confines. After years of authoritarianism, people would not aspire to live under a similarly
oppressive force; therefore the development of a more politically open and accepting ideology
was key. Concurrently, it was clear that democracy and Westernization were not unavoidable
forces. Although Al-Banna’s reasoning behind the formation of the Muslim Brotherhood was
similar in that he saw Islam at odds with Western influences, the political goals at the time
greatly differed from those fifty years later. The extent of Westernization expanded through
means other than colonization, and democracy was beating out communism and other forms of
government. These disparate state conditions had a huge effect on the strategies of each Islamist
movement.
Over the years of political tyranny against Ennahda and the Brotherhood, unlike many
Islamist groups, these two movements did not deviate towards more radical ideologies.
Although the Muslim Brotherhood went through a period in which it exercised militant activities,
this was not equivalent to those of many Islamists and did not endure. Slowly this activism
disappeared and they emerged with new political aspirations under Sadat. Many have argued
that Ennahda’s intrinsically moderate stance from the outset is what led to their more accepting
position within Tunisia’s new government. In reality, both movements have historically been
considered moderate as far as Islamist groups are concerned. The major distinction of these two
movements falls along political and democratic lines rather than religious and social.
Jillian Schwedler defines moderation “not as a behavioral change, but as a change in
ideology from a rigid and closed worldview to one relatively more open and tolerant of
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alternative perspectives.”166 This requires further analysis because comparatively, both
movements could already have been described as moderate when discussing Islamist groups.
Simultaneously, when compared with secular parties at the time of election, both parties would
be identified as extremely conservative, with uncompromising ideologies based completely on
their religious background, and therefore not moderate. In being engaged with the new system
of government, both the Muslim Brotherhood and Ennahda would be required to rearrange
portions of their ideologies in order to fit within democracy and coincide with secular parties.
While these states are both comprised of a Muslim majority, it was evident citizens would not
want Sharia to be imposed and hoped a relatively open society would transpire within the postauthoritarian transition. Ultimately, as religious parties, their conservative cultures would need
to take a backseat to promoting other politically democratic ideas. This is eventually where the
moderation of Ennahda prevailed over the Muslim Brotherhood.
Inclusion or Annexation
Elections in Tunisia and Egypt brought Islamists to the forefront of politics in systems
where they had previously been excluded. Parliamentary elections produced a majority win for
Islamists. For Ennahda in Tunisia, this was only a relative majority of 37% in which it gained 89
out of 217 seats, while the Islamists in Egypt earned a total majority.167 The Muslim
Brotherhood procured 235 of 498, or nearly half the seats, and was nudged to over half with the
inclusion of Salafists into the political system.168 Final results brought Islamists to power with
two thirds of the legislative branch in Egypt. In addition to these parliamentary wins, Ennahda
secured the position of Prime Minister and the Muslim Brotherhood the Presidential seat.
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Although these results demonstrate the impressive standing of Islamists in both states, the overall
proportion attained by the Muslim Brotherhood and fellow Islamists secured its total control over
Egypt.
Through the implementation of Islamists into the developing democratic order of Tunisia
and Egypt, moderation theory suggests that they tame their behaviors to fit into the state
structure. In spite of this, the resulting dynamics of Islamists rise to power in Tunisia and Egypt
varied drastically. The new environment allows us to see where exactly moderation came into
play within the two political parties. While Ennahda was the overall majority winner of
parliamentary elections, the manner in which the political scene was set forth meant that they
must share power with the two other parties that gained the second and third largest percentage
of votes; the Congress for the Republic (CPR) and Ettakatol. CPR, the second place party,
earned around one third the number of seats as Ennahda, but still maintained a large standing
within the government.169 Under this new system, the most prominent government positions
were delegated by this new parliament. Moncef Marzouki, the founder of CPR, was chosen to
serve as Tunisia’s President and the position of the Speaker of the Assembly was designated to
Ettakatol’s Mustafa Ben Jafaar. These two major positions in combination with Habadi Jabali
from Ennahda serving as prime minister signified that the troika government would be
compelled to collaborate. Through this method of assembling Tunisia’s new democratic system,
it was ensured that no single party could command complete control of the government. This
method of power sharing symbolizes the strength of civil society. Ennahda’s inclusion into the
National Constituent Assembly (NCA) obliged them to exercise power in a way that would not
exclude themselves from the other parties, and therefore compromise became their only option.
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In this regard, it was Ennahda’s inclusion into party politics which occurred because of civil
society’s role in the organization of the political structure that guaranteed its moderate stance.
Proponents of moderation theory generally point to inclusion leading to moderation. As
we can see from Ennahda’s experience, this is a convincing argument. Yet in this capacity,
many similarly indicated that the Muslim Brotherhood, after being brought into politics, should
have become more moderate.170 According to the Oxford Dictionary, inclusion is defined as “the
action or state of including or of being included within a group or structure,” and to include
suggests one is only “part of a whole.”171 172 Within these definitions, the case of the Muslim
Brotherhood must be analyzed again. While initially agreeing to remain separated from the
political transition for the most part, indicating that the FJP would not run for more than one
third of the seats in parliament and no presidential candidate would be endorsed, their approach
quickly reversed. Upon attaining a majority in the parliament, bolstered further by the Salafist
Nour Party and the eventual win of Morsi, the Brotherhood was not genuinely included into
politics. Instead of becoming “included within a group or structure,” or taking only a “part” of
the new government, the Brotherhood’s FJP actually became the entire system. The FJP
succeeded in achieving complete authority over the executive and legislative branch while
encroaching further into the judicial branch and even municipal administrations. This
overarching power provided to the Muslim Brotherhood through the electoral process meant that
they did not have to moderate their positions.
There are two manners in which moderation must be analyzed: politically and religiously.
In contrast with what many believed would occur, the FJP did display religious moderation while
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ignoring any political moderation. Through this, there is the possibility that the FJP was building
their political power in order to slowly implement religious laws at a later point in time. The
party needed the political space to control the religious space. With a total grip on control of
Egypt, the power hungry Muslim Brotherhood took a shot at increasing its reach across Egypt in
every facet and presumably would have continued in this manner. The Muslim Brotherhood’s
election was meant to bring about a legitimate transition to democracy, but instead the party did
not take the moderate path moderation theory suggests. This does not however imply that the
theory be abandoned; instead more determinate terms should be measured.
Civil Society and the Development of Political Islam
Under the circumstances in which these Islamist parties came to power, bringing one to
moderation and one to a more authoritarian role, the importance of civil society is key. Tunisia’s
civil society played a major role in devising the electoral conditions and the arena for political
parties under their transition to democracy. Due to the participation of nonpartisan actors, the
result brought together various parties in a more harmonious manner. Despite various hurdles
that the leading troika confronted, the management of the NCA was one that allowed parties to
confer openly. The decision to remove the ruling NCA and instead implement a technocratic
government was accepted with relative ease. The three leading parties permitted the
implementation of a new constitution and interim government in order to set the stage for new
elections in 2014. In agreeing to allow fresh elections to take place, Ennahda revealed an
important distinction from Egypt’s Morsi. The Muslim Brotherhood’s unwillingness to
cooperate and follow true democratic measures triggered their placement back into a position of
opposition. The inability to moderate its political standpoint by grasping at complete power
severely damaged the Muslim Brotherhood politically and socially. As the Muslim Brotherhood
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became an illegal movement once again, Ennahda garnered respect internally and internationally
for their distinct approach.
The basis of social support for the Muslim Brotherhood came across all levels and an
increasingly Islamicized Egyptian society indicated their success over decades. Vast social
programs that focused on areas where the government was failing to support lower classes gave
the Brotherhood a prominent status within the poor. Their involvement in business associations,
NGOs, and Islamic investment companies also bolstered their image within higher classes.
Overall, the Muslim Brotherhood’s support system seemed advantageous leading into the
election period. It was no shock when Morsi secured his seat as president in 2012. As the
largest social movement in Egypt, the Brotherhood faced no coinciding rival organization that
would lead it to tame its political stances. This is observed through the extreme polarization of
Egyptian society and the reversal of politics back into the hands of the military. Yet the decades
of religious integration into Egyptian society was not enough for the people to allow a state ruled
by Sharia, and the half century of authoritarian suppression meant people would not be willing to
live under the subjection of a single party again. By participating in politics, the Muslim
Brotherhood left behind their social activism of ninety years and manifested itself into a failing
regime. Years of success for the Brotherhood came from their integration into society at all
levels, but once given a larger space for power, their opportunity was squandered. Electoral
victory proved yet again the prominence of the movement, but in the end, their focus was better
suited for social activism rather than political development.
Within a movement that flourished for almost a century, its demise was fairly shocking.
The removal of Morsi after a year in office demonstrates the true aspirations of the Egyptian
people and their unfamiliarity with how to achieve it. The Muslim Brotherhood’s reluctance to
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share power and incorporate secular or leftist parties within their new power structure promoted
a greater focus solely on the Brotherhood. Had Egypt’s civil society been stronger and another
segment of society produced enough value during transition, dialogue would have been more
open and compromise more necessary. In the absence of another central civil society
organization, the Muslim Brotherhood was left to bear the burden of transition to a political
system in which it had no experience and attempted to do so alone.
Ennahda, like the Muslim Brotherhood had many social programs that it developed over
decades. However, the Islamist party did not enjoy as widespread influence as the Brotherhood.
However, the election results still made it clear that the party was respected and boasted a large
support group within Tunisia. Additional prominent organizations also existed within Tunisia as
seen in the previous chapter, and provided a major influence on the transition period. Due to the
secular, impartial, and broad based nature of civil society organizations beyond Ennahda,
especially the UGTT, their position in the transition was integral. In Egypt, the only civil
organization comparable in scope and influence to the UGTT is the Brotherhood. The
Brotherhood’s one-sidedness brought about a drastically different result within the transition
process.
Salafist Implementation
Within the field of moderation, looking at the Salafist movements in both countries can
further expand on this theory. Egyptian Salafists have a long history, predating the rise of the
Muslim Brotherhood. There are various groups of Salafists with each segment supporting a
distinct method of action and change. According to the majority, combining Islam with politics
is not possible, and does not do justice to Islam, believing that they must turn to Sharia for
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solutions.173 The most politically important school of Salafists within Egypt now is the Dawa
Salafists. This segment of Salafists deviated from the model and formed its own political party,
Al-Nour, which supplemented Islamist support in the legislative branch. These Salafists
promoted a contemporary outlook in order to be relevant in modern society and they emphasize
the notion of collective action.174 This change in political ideology brought about several issues
of controversy among the Salafist schools since the removal of Mubarak. Many Salafists have
accused the Dawa Salafists of becoming impure, resulting in excommunication.175 Unlike the
changing ideologies of the Muslim Brotherhood in attempting to keep up with system dynamics,
the majority of Salafists hoped to continue the promotion of a more pure form of Islam.
As noted previously, the Al-Nour party’s decision to enter politics greatly improved the
Muslim Brotherhoods position in government. The combination of both the Salafists and the
Muslim Brotherhood lead to an overriding majority of Islamists in power, giving them ultimate
control over the state. While Al-Nour attempted to persuade the Brotherhood to implement more
strict Islamic laws in Egypt’s constitution, the Brotherhood did not follow these guidelines.
Through this we can see that because the Salafists were combined with another Islamist faction
in Egypt they did not see a need to moderate religiously, and instead attempted to bring the
Brotherhood to implement more radical reforms. The Muslim Brotherhood was the more
religiously moderate force within this bipartisan government, but exhibited no moderation
politically. Because the power sharing in Egypt occurred solely within two Islamic groups with
no involvement of secular groups, collaborative efforts to bring about moderation did not occur.
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Nevertheless, once the FJP was ousted, Al-Nour bandwagoned with other parties in
formulating the new roadmap for Egypt and represented an impressive force for Muslims within
this new formation. This change in behavior represents the Salafists more moderate
transformation in two ways. The first came with their initial decision to form a political party, in
a compromise that rejected all former ideals of Salafists and their notion that politics and Islam
could not unite. Although the group moderated in this way, their eventual entrance into the
parliament did not prove to moderate them as there was no motive. Within distinct points in time
during Egypt’s transition, moderation theory can be applied. While a weak civil society
attempted to form political parties and it was believed that a new and openly democratic system
would ensue, the party’s first move towards moderation tactics followed. Once Islamists secured
the control over the government, there was no longer a need for the Salafist group to moderate
their stance, and instead they were able to push more hardline initiatives. The same principle
applied to the Muslim Brotherhood at this time. The second alteration came when Salafists
moderated their stance again during a period in which Egypt needed to regroup its political
environment and construct a new electoral path. At this point, inclusion into society altered the
position of the Salafists who hoped to preserve their position in the government and garner
respect for doing so. The Al-Nour party ultimately succeeded in this regard although religious
parties have been banned due to the culminating challenges with the Brotherhood.
The rise of Salafism in Tunisia has demonstrated a great challenge to the more
democratic Ennahda. Due to the rise in Salafist movements in Tunisia undermining the Islamic
ideals of Ennahda, tension between the two Islamist groups was often the focal point of political
concerns.176 The Salafists claim that the Islam practiced and incorporated by Ennahda through
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democracy is impure.177 Unlike in Egypt, Salafists in Tunisia have not experienced a strong
show of support, and inclusion into politics did not occur. Despite the Salafists unwillingness to
enter into the political field in Tunisia, Ennahda did make attempts to communicate with the
more radical group and include them in their political agenda. Efforts taken by Ennahda to
create ties with Salafists failed and led to dwindling opinions of Ennahda due to their attempt to
moderate the groups’ behaviors.178 The more radical nature of the Salafists thus became a key
concern of the more center Ennahda party and leftist groups. This fanatic character of Salafists
in Tunisia was not restrained during the transition period, and instead we witnessed a period of
intensified conflict between the government and hardline Islamists.
Islamist Failures
By and large, Islamists within the Middle East have experienced extremely hostile
environments. Islamist parties have dealt with constant repression and leaders express constant
fear of Islamist power. Within the past twenty years, there have been two major attempts to
bring Islamists to power democratically that have failed considerably. These include Algeria in
the 1990s and Egypt within the past two years. The major clashes between the state and
Islamists in both cases have exemplified to Ennahda situations to be avoided in order to
successfully manage its political presence. In the first case, the democratic election of FIS in
Algeria was never fully implemented. In response to being cut off from their elected institutions,
many of these Islamists radicalized and the country saw a bloody ten-year civil war. The
Algerian case shows the consequences of suppressing the fanatics. Initial inclusion into politics
lead to a moderate Islamist party hoping to play a part in politics, but after their dismissal, the
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opposite affect occurred. This experience of violently suppressing rather than negotiating with
Islamists had a greater impact on both Islamist and anti-Islamist Tunisians than on their Egyptian
counterparts. This suppression contributed further to the very different outcomes of the 20132014 protracted negotiations between the two sides in Tunisia, the violent suppression in Egypt
of the Islamist opposition and the Brotherhood’s refusal to leave power. As previously
mentioned, Ennahda’s formation differed greatly from that of the Muslim Brotherhood in that it
hoped to cultivate Islam within the existing space rather than completely ignore the current
trends. This suggests that Ennahda would place a greater importance on the results of other
Islamists in the region than the Muslim Brotherhood would.
Throughout many points of contention between Islamists and state factions, Ghannoushi
has intervened as a moderator between the two sides. This indicates his insurmountable
importance to both secularists and Islamists when confronted with contentious political issues.
Throughout elections in Egypt during 2012, Ghannoushi was aware of the impenetrable
momentum of the Brotherhood and attempted to impart his own wisdom upon the group in hopes
that a power sharing arrangement could be made.179 Again, in the days leading up to Morsi’s
ouster, Ghannoushi attempted to discuss with Morsi a plan to step down and allow a new
election process to take place.180 Within the past year, Ghannoushi was also attributed to playing
a major role in the reconciliatory efforts of Hamas and Fatah in Palestine.181 Conciliatory actions
of Ghannoushi and Ennahda in this regard have also been implemented within its own internal
attitude. When Ennahda was faced with its own growing opposition Tamarod group, it took the
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advice previously given to Morsi and agreed to amendments within the political power structure,
ultimately removing themselves from the coalition government and transferring power to the
technocratic government. The attentive reactions of Ennahda towards opposition that came from
secular movements as well as more radical Islamists can be largely attributed to a greater
understanding of the modern political system. Adaptation continues to be an essential attribute
that Ghannoushi imparted on Ennahda and has attempted to demonstrate to other Islamists in
order to aid their success.182 Moderation continues to be a process for Ennahda through
compromise with secular parties.
Conclusion
The Arab Spring brought about a chance for Islamists to model Islamic democracy and
demonstrate its possibility. Three major factors played a role in the ability of Ennahda to
maintain its prominence within Tunisia. The first includes its overall more democratically
oriented policies. Ghannoushi was aware that Qutb’s ideologies for the Muslim Brotherhood
could have been appropriate for the time, but should not be a basis for other nations or societies
at different stages.183 Within this, he sought answers for the problems facing Tunisians
politically and religiously. This democratic orientation should not be misconstrued as what
constitutes the movement’s moderate attitude. Secondly, the inclusion of Ennahda into the
political formation was imperative. Despite being known as a moderate political party, given the
chance, Ennahda still may have taken a more aggressively Islamic approach or, just as the
Muslim Brotherhood did, they may have annexed complete control. Thirdly, Ennahda’s
international perspective and interpersonal relations with Islamists in the region gave it a
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stronger perspective on how to manage their own party. The last two factors both led to the
party’s moderate stance once reaching a political opening.
The Muslim Brotherhood while also upholding a relatively moderate stance over the past
few decades did not benefit from the same politically budding environment as Ennahda.
Originally viewed as an asset, the affluence garnered by the Brotherhood over almost a century
that managed to carry it into the political scene, was truly a drawback. Its predominant control
of civil society left the Brotherhood as Egypt’s only choice in the election period, and with a
scattered political platform, there was little guidance. The archaic nature of its ideologies
remained unwavering under the older leadership. As seen throughout the past few decades, this
brought about an internal rupture within the Muslim Brotherhood, through which generations
brought up under significantly different historical conditions sought change through more
political measures. Without obliging the Brotherhood to merge with other prominent civil
society organizations, due to their nonexistence, there was no prospect for the movement to
successfully moderate its behavior. The Muslim Brotherhood’s inward focus left it stagnant and
without a successful political model or guide.
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7- Conclusion
The failure of Egypt to move successfully towards democracy over the past four years is
often attributed to the overarching power taken by its military throughout the course of
transition. However, this military impediment was due to the lack of a significant civil society
alternative. Over the course of transition in both Egypt and Tunisia, both states envisioned a
transformative move towards democracy. In this, a place for moderate Islamists to govern the
countries was established. Moderation theory suggests that within the scenarios faced by Egypt
and Tunisia, these Islamists would find a way to moderate their policies in order to be accepted
by the people and included in the new political process. As countries with relatively moderate
Islamist parties existing, the general sense was that the Muslim Brotherhood and Ennahda be
allowed to participate in the new political atmosphere.
These two states saw declining economies with a government that backed only a small
subset of elite. Both had repressive systems that allowed for minimal civic engagement in the
past. Both states had militaries that violated orders that directed them to protect the regime and
instead intercepted police brutality against peaceful protestors. Both states witnessed the
placement of a former regime member into the new provisional government, and both pressed
for the subsequent eradication of the departed regime and impeded the ability of its members to
take part within the new government. Both voted Islamists to power within elections, giving
them major power in parliament and the executive branch, and both demanded the removal of
Islamists after there came no sense of improving conditions. Although these many similarities
exist within the few years since the removal of Ben Ali and Mubarak, today’s results could not
be more different.
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While there were many setbacks on the road to transition for Tunisia, they have
maintained a path that has lead them to what many see as a consolidated democracy in an
approach that became accepted by its citizens. Through this process, the democratic system
seems to have emerged with a combination of Islamists and secularists, giving a voice to a
varying spectrum of ideologies. Egypt on the other hand, perceived as following this democratic
process as well with the election of Morsi, has a society that has become divided more than ever
and a government that continues to repress its people regardless of the democratic election of
Sisi.184 Within this case, Islamists did not prove to moderate their ideologies sufficiently enough
to appease Egyptians. This variance is largely due to Egypt’s lacking secular civil society.
Throughout this period, there has been one major difference within the transition and this
was the existence of a prominent civil society that through checks and balances continually
enforced a stable direction for Tunisia's new government. In the absence of such a vehicle
within Egypt, the transition was directed back to the two prevailing elements that exhibited
strength over centuries of Egyptian history; the military and the Muslim Brotherhood.
Though many argue that the Egyptian military impeded the country’s ability to
successfully democratize by placing themselves at the helm during two distinguished points in
time, we can see that this argument is not completely valid. The major role played by the
military over the course of transition did not come about through its own will. In both instances,
it was Egyptians that pleaded to SCAF and demanded their intervention in order to prevent what
they saw as a much worse fate: the continuation of the Mubarak regime through members of his
political party taking charge or the continuation of the Muslim Brotherhood’s sequestration of
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power. The strength accumulated by the military over decades of close ties with the government
gave them the ultimate power in the scenario of transition in Egypt, but in a largely different
capacity than most give it credit. The implementation of Ahmed Shafiq as the head of
government immediately following Mubarak’s removal could have been avoided from the get-go
had the military’s true goal been to garner control of Egypt. However, Tantawi only took charge
and agreed to head the transition as requested by Egyptian protestors. Had there been another
strong materialization of civil society that could have played an equally robust role, as was the
case in Tunisia, the direction of transition in Egypt may have taken a drastic turn.
With the ensuing disagreeable atmosphere in Egypt because of the military’s command
and the perceived notion that they would not give up control along with harsh actions they took
on protestors over the following year, the only other major social movement in Egypt was able to
take advantage of the circumstances and secure control over all government offices. Ultimately,
the Muslim Brotherhood’s succession to power led to devastating results for Egypt’s transition.
Rather than formulating a power-sharing role for the government, members of non-religious
political parties were not included into the country’s new attempt at democracy. This only
brought about a new environment where Egyptians saw authoritarianism encroaching on their
aspirations for freedom. As their capacity to accomplish democracy seemed to dwindle, the
population again tried to remove their leader from office. The resulting environment only made
room for the military to once again take charge, abiding by the wishes of those who instigated
the protests against Morsi. While the second rise to power by the military saw them attempt to
implement a more civil government that would be accepted by the people, the military retained
its predominant power. Due to the weakened and polarized environment in Egypt, the military
remained the only force strong enough to guide the country. Thus, it was not the military that
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prevented a transition towards consolidated democracy, but rather the states continual reliance on
the military in the absence of its own apolitical alliance with the strength to unify Egyptians and
organize a political structure free from authoritarian remnants.
The evolving political environment in Egypt saw extreme polarization rather than the
convergence of a diverse civil society. In contrast with this, it was Tunisia’s UGTT that came
out as a major player throughout its own transition. As previously examined, it is possible to
envision where this role came from. While Tunisia and Egypt had similar moments of
progression and deterioration of their economies, Bourguiba and Ben Ali both placed a higher
importance on education than the leaders of Egypt. Due to this advancement, although people
did not necessarily enjoy a better quality of life in Tunisia versus Egypt, the levels of education
developed a more firm background for Tunisians to enter the political scene. Repression against
political and religious study undoubtedly influenced the atmosphere of Tunisian transition in a
deep way, yet the overall knowledge and ability of Tunisians to participate in the election
process was significantly improved through education. Overall, economic conditions of the two
countries did not make one more likely to succeed with a transition to democracy, but Ben Ali’s
focus on schooling did have a major effect on boosting Tunisia’s civil society in a way that
would consequently encourage improved political discourse.
Just as the Muslim Brotherhood had suggested it would do during the first round of
presidential elections in Egypt, Ennahda indicated it would not place a candidate for Tunisia’s
2014 presidential elections; A promise that, unlike the Brotherhood, Ennahda has kept to the
people. This action, like many others taken by Ennahda, has shown that Ennahda is more
cooperative, and hopes to maintain respect with the people of Tunisia and adhere to Tunisian
aspirations unlike the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. A large part of this is due to the pressure
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placed on Ennahda through their inclusion in politics over the past four years. In the absence of
compromise in Egypt and its presence in Tunisia, the Egyptian military intervened but the
Tunisian military didn’t. This is connected to the strength of civil society in Tunisia that was
significantly lacking within Egypt. It was inclusion of civil society within the political realm that
prompted the more moderate path followed by Ennahda. The Muslim Brotherhood, on the other
hand, was not included into politics, and therefore did not have to moderate. Ultimately, the
Brotherhood and its Islamist allies made up the entire Egyptian system of governance after
presidential elections in 2012, due to gaining a majority in parliament and acquiring the
presidency. Inclusion therefore did not exist and moderation did not ensue. Despite originally
embracing democracy, following actions and the miscalculated governance of the Brotherhood
led Egyptians to decry the group and plead for military intervention. There was no ability to
form a compromise with the Brotherhood in which they could find a solution with the people
other than their complete removal due to the significant mismanagement of the new Egyptian
government.
Had their existed an additional secular organization with the prestige garnered by the
Brotherhood or military over Egyptian history, the outcome may have presented itself
comparably to the Tunisian scenario of inclusion and moderation with Ennahda. This major
intrinsic difference in the transition of both countries led to extremely distinctive results for their
Islamists. Within this, Tunisia has accomplished the major feat of becoming a democratic state
comprising of Islamists in their governance structure after years of authoritarianism while Egypt
has failed to structure any meaningful transformations. The presence of civil society as a
regulator throughout the Tunisian transition constituted this critical disparity as it ensured that a
political environment was created that would promote dialogue amongst political parties
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consequently forcing Ennahda to moderate. Due to this unprecedented success by Tunisia in
consolidating its democracy over the four years since its revolution, Tunisia has become a model
for the region.185

185

Yüksel Sezgin. “Why is Tunisian Democracy Succeeding While the Turkish Model is
Failing?” The Washington Post, (2014).
117

Bibliography
Abedin, Mahan. “Tunisia: Islamist Leader Returns from Exile – An Interview with Rashid AlGhannoushi.” Le Monde Diplomatique, 2011.
Aboulenein, Ahmed. “Naguib: the Sidelined General President.” Daily News Egypt, 2012.
Achy, Laheen. “Tunisia’s Economic Challenges.” Cargnegie Endowment, 2011.
Ajami, Fouad. “In the Pharaoh’s Shadow: Religion and Authority in Egypt.” Islam in the
Political Process, ed. James P. Piscatori, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
Alexander, Christopher. “Tunisia’s Islamists II: The Salafists.” Wilson Center, 2013.
Aleya-Sghaier, Amira. “The Tunisian Revolution: The Revolution of Dignity.” Revolution,
Revolt, and Reform in North Africa: The Arab Spring and Beyond, ed. Ricardo Rene
Laremont, New York: Routledge, 2014.
Al-Anani, Khalil. “The Islamists’ Paradox: Inclusion and Moderation.” Ahram Online, 2013.
Al-Jalassi, Mohammad Yassin. “Accusations Fly on Tunisian Opposition Assassinations.” AlMonitor, 2013.
“Algeria, Tunisia See Parallels in Egypt’s Drama.” Gulf Times, 2013.
Amara, Tarek. “Tunisia’s Islamists Cede Power to Caretaker Government.” Reuters, 2014.
“Arab Political Systems: Baseline Information and Reforms- Tunisia.” Carnegie Endowment For
International Peace, 2005.
Arieff, Alexis. “Political Transitions in Tunisia.” Congressional Research Service, 2012.
Alexis Arieff and Carla E. Humud. “Political Transition in Tunisia.” Congressional Research
Service, 2015.
Ashour, Omar. “Continuity and Change in Islamist Political Thought and Behavior: The
Transformations of Armed Islamist Movements of Egypt and Algeria.” The Changing
Middle East: A New Look at Regional Dynamics, ed. Bahgat Korany, 2010.
Bahi, Riham and Jan Vökel. “The Surprising Success of the Tunisian Parliament.” Open
Democracy, 2014.
Baran, Zeyno. “Fighting the War of Ideas.” Foreign Affairs, 2005.

118

Barany, Zoltan. “The Role of the Military: Comparing the Arab Revolts.” Journal of Democracy,
2011.
Bellin, Eva. “Lessons from the Jasmine and Nile Revolutions: Possibilities of Political
Transformation in the Middle East?” Crown Center for Middle East Studies, 2011.
Bellin, Eva. “Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East.”
Comparative Politics, 2012.
Bellin, Eva. “Stalled Democracy: Capital, Labor and the Paradox of State-Sponsored
Development.” Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 2002.
Ben Ayed, Mohnder. “All Politics is Economics: How Economic Reform can Save Tunisia.”
Foreign Policy, 2014.
Boughzala, Mongi. “Youth Unemployment and Economic Transition in Tunisia.” Brookings
Institute, 2013.
Cambanis, Thanassis. “Egypt's Revolutionary Elite and the Silent Majority.” Middle East
Institute, 2011.
Carothers, Thomas. “The End of the Transition Paradigm.” Journal of Democracy, 2002.
Carr, Sarah. “April 6: Genealogy of a Youth Movement.” Jadaliyya, 2012.
Chayes, Sarah. “How a Leftist Labor Union Helped Force Tunisia’s Political Settlement.”
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2014.
Chick, Kristen. “Egypt Election Routs Popular Muslim Brotherhood from Parliament.” The
Christian Science Monitor. 2010.
“Constitutional Delcaration 2011.” Egyptian Government Services Portal, 2011.
Cook, Steven A. “Ruling but not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt,
Algeria and Turkey.” Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007.
Cook, Steven A. “Struggle For Egypt: From Nasser to Tahrir Square.” Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2011.
“Country Status and Ratings by Region, 1973-2014.” Freedom House, 2014.
Dahl, Robert. “Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy.” New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982.
Daragahi, Borzou. “Caught in Tunisia’s Labor Market Trap.” Financial Times, 2013.

119

Davis-Packard, Kent. “A Ripple Beneath the Surface: Trends in Salafi Political Thought: What
they Mean for Egypt and U.S.-Egyptian Relations.” Brookings, 2014.
Deane, Shelley. “Transforming Tunisia: The Role of Civil Society in Tunsia’s Transition.”
International Alert, 2013.
Diamond, Larry. “Why are there no Arab Democracies?” Journal of Arab Democracy, 2010.
Dickinson, Elizabeth. “The First WikiLeaks Revolution?” Foreign Policy, 2013.
E.B. “Transition in Tunisia: A Success Story?” The Economist, 2014.
Eden, Anthony and Dwight D. Eisenhower. “Eden-Eisenhower Correspondence, 1955-1957.”
The University of North Carolina Press, 2005.
“Egypt Country Report.” Bertelsmann Transformation Index, 2014.
“Egypt: Don’t Cover Up Military Killing of Copt Protesters.” Human Rights Watch, 2011.
“Egypt’s Islamist Parties Win Elections to Parliament.” BBC, 2012.
El-Bendary, Mohamed. “The Egyptian Revolution: Between Hope and Despair: Mubarak to
Morsi.” New York: Algora Publishing, 2013.
El-Dabh, Basil. “June 30: Tamarod and Its Opponents.” Middle East Institute, 2013.
El-Issawi, Fatima. “Tunisian Media in Transition.” Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 2012.
El-Sherif, Ashraf. “The Salafi Movement: Competing Visions, Part 1.” Egypt Independent, 2012.
Esposito, John L. and John O. Voll. “Rachid Ghannoushi: Activist in Exile.” Makers of
Contemporary Islam, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.
Fam, Mariam and Tamim Elyan. “Glimpse of Egypt Stability Enough for Some to Resume
Deals.” Bloomberg, 2014.
Fahmi, Georges. “The Egyptian State and the Religious Sphere.” Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 2014.
Fahmy, Ninette S. “The Performance of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egyptian Syndicates: An
Alternative Formula for Reform?” The Middle East Institute, 1998.
“Final Report on the Tunisian National Constituent Assembly Elections.” National Democratic
Institute, 2011.

120

“First Court Date Set in Case to Ban Facebook, Twitter in Egypt.” Mada Masr, 2014.
“Freedom in the World: 2015.” Freedom House, 2015.
Gall, Carlotta. “Tunisian Islamist Finds Hope in Challenging Time.” The New York Times, 2013.
Gause, Gregory F. “Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring.” Foreign Affairs, 2011.
“Getting to Pluralism: Political Actors in the Arab World.” ed. Marina Ottaway and Amr
Hamzawy, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009.
Ghaus-Pasha, Aisha. “Role of Civil Society in Governance,” 2004.
“Gini Index By Country: Middle East and North Africa.” Quandl, 2015.
“Global Competetiveness Report, 2014-15.” World Economic Forum, 2014.
Gobe, Eric. “The Gafsa Mining Basin between Riots and a Social Movement: Meaning and
Significance of a Protest Movement in Ben Ali’s Tunisia.” Working paper, 2010.
Goldberg, Ellis. “A New Political Dilemma for Egypt’s Ruling Military.” The Washington Post,
2014.
Goldberg, Ellis. “Mubarakism Without Mubarak: Why Egypt’s Military Will Not Embrace
Democracy.” Foreign Affairs, 2011.
Hamid, Shadi. “The Struggle for Middle East Democracy.” The Cairo Review of Global Affairs,
2011.
Hamzawy, Amr and Nathan J. Brown. “The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood: Islamist
Participation in a Closing Political Environment.” Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, Washington DC, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010.
Harbi, Mohamed. “Le FLN Mirage et Réalité: Des Origines á la Prise de Pouvoir (1945-1962).”
Paris: Jeune Afrique, 1980.
Hearst, David. “Muslim Brotherhood Urged to Share Power in Egypt.” The Guardian, 2012.
Hellyer, H.A. “Tunisia Stands at Political Crossroads in its Revolutionary Transition.” Al
Arabiya, 2014.
Hibou, Beatrice. “The Force of Obedience: The Political Economy of Repression in Tunisia.”
Polity Press, 2011.
“How Censorship Stifled Us in Tunisia.” The Tunis Times, 2013.

121

Huntington, Samuel. “The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century.”
Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993.
“Include.” Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.
“Inclusion.” Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.
“Inequality In America Is Worse Than In Egypt, Tunisia Or Yemen.” Washington’s Blog, 2011.
Jebnoun, Nouredinne. “In the Shadow of Power: Civil-Military Relations and the Tunisian
Popular Uprising.” The Journal of North African Studies, 2014.
Jeffrey, James F. and Soner Cagaptay. “Moderating Islamists: Turkey’s Lessons for Egypt.” The
Washington Institute, 2013.
Johnson, Toni and Mohammed Aly Sergie. “Islam: Governing Under Sharia.” Council on
Foreign Relations, 2014.
Joyce, Robert. “The Regional Inequality Behind Tunisia’s Revolution.” Atlantic Council, 2013.
Kaminski, Matthew. “Egypt and the Limits of Protest.” The Wall Street Journal, 2012.
Karon, Tony. “Egypt Bleeds as the Battle over Democracy and Power Escalates.” TIME, 2011.
Khalil, Jahad. “Tunisia’s Unfinished Revolution.” The Nation, 2014.
Khatib, Lina. “Political Participation and Democratic Transition in the Arab World.” Journal of
International Law, 2013.
Kholaif, Dahlia. “Egypt Outlaws anti-Mubarak April 6 Movement.” Al Jazeera, 2014.
Kriaa, Mohamed, Slim Driss, and Zouhour Karray. “Multidimensional Inequality and Spatial
Disparities in Tunisia.” Economic Research Forum, 2011.
Lang, Hardin, Mokhtar Awad, Peter Juul, and Brian Katulis. “Tunisia’s Struggle for Political
Pluralism After Ennahda.” Center for American Progress, 2014.
Larémont, Ricardo René. “Revolution, Revolt, and Reform in North Africa: The Arab Spring
and Beyond.” New York: Routledge, 2014.
Laub, Zachary. “Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood.” Council on Foreign Relations, 2014.
Leiken, Robert S. and Steven Brooke. “The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood,” Foreign Affairs,
2007.

122

Lengyel, Emil. “Reviewed work(s): Egypt's Destiny by Mohammed Naguib.” Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, Sage Publications Inc., 1955.
Linz, Juan J., and Alfred Stepan. “Democratization Theory and the ‘Arab Spring.’” Journal of
Democracy, 2013.
Linz, Juan J., and Alfred Stepan. “Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation:
Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe.” Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1996.
Linz, Juan J. and Alfred Stepan. “Toward Consolidated Democracies.” Journal of Democracy,
1996.
Lipset, Seymour. “The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited.” American Sociological
Review, 1994.
Lust, Ellen. “Competitive Clientelism in the Middle East.” Journal of Democracy, 2009.
Malley-Morrison, Kathleen. “State Violence and the Right to Peace: Western Europe and North
America.” Greenwood Publishing Group, 2009.
Martini, Jeffery, Dalia Dassa Kaye, and Erin York. “The Muslim Brotherhood, It’s Youth, and
Implications for U.S. Engagement.” RAND, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2012.
Masoud, Tarek. “The Road to (and from) Liberation Square.” Journal of Democracy, 2011.
Mavin, Rebecca. “Can Bouteflika's Victory Really Maintain the Peace?” Your Middle East,
2014.
Merone, Fabio and Francesco Cavatorta. “The Emergence of Salafism in Tunisia.” Jadaliyya,
2012.
“Middle East Record Volume 2, 1961.” ed. Yitzhak Oron, 1961.
Morsy, Ahmed. “The Military Crowds Out Civilian Business in Egypt.” Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace,” 2014.
Moustafa, Tamir. “The Struggle for Constitutional Power: Law, Politics, and Economic
Development in Egypt.” Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
Nagarajan, K.V. “Egypt’s Political Economy and the Downfall of the Mubarak Regime.”
International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, 2013.
Owen, Roger. “State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East.” New York:
Routledge, 1992.

123

Pachon, Alejandro. “Loyalty and Defection: Misunderstanding Civil-Military Relations in
Tunisia During the ‘Arab Spring.” Journal of Strategic Studies, 2014.
“Presidential Election in Egypt.” The Carter Center, 2012.
Preston, Jennifer. “Movement Began With Outrage and a Facebook Page That Gave It an
Outlet.” The New York Times, 2011.
Ramadan, Tariq. “Democratic Turkey Is the Template for Egypt‘s Muslim Brotherhood.” New
Perspectives Quarterly, 2011.
Roberts, Hugh. “The Revolution that Wasn’t.” London Review of Books, 2013.
Rohac, Dalibor. “Behind the Success of Political Islam.” CATO Institute, 2013.
Sala, Xavier. “Economic Drowth and Investment in the Arab World.” 2002.
Saleh, Yasmine and Asma Alsharif. “Egypt Army Plan Would Scrap Constitution, Parliament.”
Reuters, 2013.
Saif, Ibrahim. “Challenges of Egypt’s Economic Transition.” Carnegie Endowment For
International Peace, 2011.
Samir, Samar. “Hamas’ Mashal to Travel to Tunisia: Nahdah Member.” The Cairo Post, 2014.
Sayigh, Yezid. “The Specter of ‘Protected Democracy’ in Egypt.” Carnegie Europe, 2011.
Schmitter, Philippe C., and Guillermo O’Donnell. “Transitions from Authoritarian Rule:
Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies.” Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1986.
Schwedler, Jilian. “Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen.” Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Sezgin, Yüksel. “Why is Tunisian Democracy Succeeding While the Turkish Model is Failing?”
The Washington Post, 2014.
Shahin, Emad Eldin. “Tunisia’s Renaissance Party: The Rise and Repression of an Islamic
Movement.” Middle East Insight, 1995.
Shenker, Jack. “Hosni Mubarak's Puppet Trade Union Federation Dismantled.” The Guardian,
2011.
“Sisi Sworn in as President of Egypt.” State Information Service, 2014.

124

Soage, Ana Belén. “Hasan al-Banna And Sayyid Qutb: Continuity or Rupture?” The Muslim
World, 2009.
Stampini, Marco. “Labor Market Dynamics in Tunisia: The Issue of Youth Unemployment.”
African Development Bank, 2011.
Stepan, Alfred and Juan Linz. “Democratization Theory and the ‘Arab Spring.’” Journal of
Democracy, 2013.
Stepan, Alfred. “Tunisia’s Transition and the Twin Tolerations.” Journal of Democracy, 2012.
Stiles, Kendall. “State Responses to International Law.” New York, Routledge, 2015.
Stilt, Kristen. “Islam is the Solution: Constitutional Visions of the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood.” Texas International Law Journal, 2010.
Sukhoparova, Irina. “Has Egypt Learned the Lesson of Electing Military Leaders?” RT, 2014.
Teti, Andrea and Gennaro Gervasio. “The Politics of Egypt’s Elections.” Open Democracy,
2011.
Tezcür, Güneş Murat. “Muslim Reformers in Iran and Turkey: The Paradox of Moderation.”
Austin: University of Texas Press, 2010.
“The Future Role of Civil Society.” World Economic Forum, 2013.
Toensing, Chris. “Tunisian Labor Leaders Reflect Upon Revolt.” Middle East Research and
Information Project, 2011.
“Tunisia Country.” Bertelsmann Stiftung, Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012.
“Tunisia Country Report.” Bertelsmann Transformation Index, 2014.
“Tunisia: Elections in an Atmosphere of Repression.” Human Rights Watch, 2009.
“Tunisia,” Freedom House.
“Tunisia.” International Alert, 2013.
“Tunisia’s Islamist Ennahda Party Wins Historic Poll.” BBC, 2011.
“Tunisia’s Successful Presidential Elections ‘Critical Step’ in Country’s Transition – Ban.” UN
News Centre, 2014.

125

Vatin, Jean-Claude. “Popular Puritanism Versus State Reformism: Islam in Algeria.” Islam in
the Political Process. James P. Piscatori, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1983.
“Washington Consensus.” World Health Organization.
Weinbaum, Marvin G. “Egypt’s ‘Infitah’ and the Politics of US Economic Assistance.” Middle
Eastern Studies, 1985.
Wickham, Carrie Rosefsky. “Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in
Egypt.” New York: Columbia University Press, 2002.
Wickham, Carrie Rosefsky. “The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of an Islamist Movement.”
Princeton University Press, 2013.
Willis, Michael J. “Politics and Power in the Maghreb: Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco from
Independence to the Arab Spring.” New York: Columbia University Press, 2012.
Zahid, Mohammed. “The Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt’s Succession Crisis: The Politics of
Liberalisation and Reform in the Middle East,” 2010.
Zakaria, Fareed. “Fareed Zakaria: Why democracy took root in Tunisia and not Egypt.” The
Washington Post, 2014.
Zartman, I. Willian. “The Challenge of Democratic Alternatives in the Maghrib.” Islamism and
Secularism in North Africa, ed. John Ruedy, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994.
Zubaida, Sami. “Islam, the State and Democracy: Contrasting Conceptions of Society in Egypt.”
Middle East Report, 1992.

126

